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This project consists of a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) of the costs, issues and effects 
associated with replacing the F-5E/F Tiger II aircraft with F/A-18A/B.  The three alternatives 
analyzed are (1) continued operation of the F-5E/F, (2) replacement of the F-5 with F/A-18A/B 
by 2008, and (3) installation of 4th generation pulse-doppler radar in the F-5E/F by 2008.  The 
objective was to compare the three alternatives, choosing the alternative which provides the 
greatest net benefit and most efficient use of resources.  The analysis involved data collection of 
operational costs per flight hour, total cost over the life of the program, and Contractor 
supported maintenance.  Data for this research project were gathered from the actual 
maintenance contracts for both the F-5E/F Tiger and F/A-18A/B aircraft at Fallon, NV,  Naval 
Aviation Systems Command, and OFC-20.  Our results suggest that NAVAIR should continue 
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In response to increasing defense budget scrutiny and a desire for smarter 
spending, the Office of the Chief of Naval Aviation (N-78) is actively pursuing several 
initiatives to reduce the variety of naval aircraft in service and their associated support 
costs.  The US Navy currently operates 68 different type/model/series (T/M/S) aircraft.1  
The F-5 Tiger II aircraft is a candidate for retirement because of its sole mission to 
provide adversary training.   
The Navy’s history with adversary training began when it instituted formal 
Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT) program in 1968 by establishing the US Navy 
Postgraduate Course in Fighter Weapons Tactics and Doctrine at NAS Miramar, which is 
better known as Top Gun.  A detailed history of the US Navy’s aggressor squadrons is 
included in appendix A.  DACT was established in response to relatively poor naval air-
to-air combat in Vietnam--the kill ratio being only about two to one in favor of the Navy, 
which was far from satisfactory2.  The first DACT course convened in March 1969.  
Initially DACT emphasized close- in, air-to-air dogfighting.  This tactic had 
become almost obsolete because of the usage of air-to-air missiles in combat.  The DACT 
program taught student aviators to pay closer attention to the flying characteristics of 
aircraft flown by the enemy.  The Douglas A-4 Skyhawk attack aircraft and Northrop T-
38A Talon trainers were used as adversary aircraft because they were small, highly 
maneuverable, and well suited to simulate the Soviet fighters of the day.  The adversary 
aircraft were painted with enemy camouflage schemes, enabling students to visually 
recognize potential enemies.     
This program was successful in improving the Navy's kill ratio in combat over 
Vietnam, and by 1972, the Navy's kill ratio in air-to-air combat had increased to about 12 
to 13.  The success of the program resulted in the Top Gun program being elevated in 
                                                 
1 Optimizing the Size of Naval Aviation’s Aircraft Inventory, Naval Air Systems Command, PowerPoint 
Presentation April 24,2003. 
2 http://home.att.net/~jbaugher1/f5_28.html Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II for US Navy. January 2, 2000. 
3 Ibid 
2 
status to that of a separate establishment in July 1, 1972, when it formally adopted the 
title Navy Fighter Weapons School (NFWS).  At the same time, it was decided to expand 
the Top Gun program beyond NFWS at Miramar.  Hence, the Navy set up dedicated full-
time adversary squadrons at both NAS Oceana, Virginia and at NAS Miramar, 
California.  These squadrons were designated VF-43 "Challengers" and VF-126 
"Bandits." 
In February 1970, VF-126 commenced DACT when it received four A-4s for 
instrument and countermeasures training.  In 1981, VF-126 relinquished it s instrument 
training responsibilities to VA-127 and become a dedicated adversary unit.  VF-126 
acquired three F-5Es from VF-43 when that unit re-equipped with F-21As.  In 1990, VF-
126 decommissioned in September of 1993 and handed over its responsibilities to VFC-
13 and their F/A-18s. 
In 1975, the US Navy Fighter Weapons School obtained ten F-5Es and three F-
5Fs from the USAF for use in dissimilar air combat training.  After providing dissimilar 
air combat opportunities to the fighter communities on the East and West Coasts, the 
Navy went on to provide similar opportunities to light attack A-7 Corsair squadrons.  
These were VA-45 at Cecil Field, Florida (later relocated to NAS Key West, Florida 
where it was eventually redesignated VF-45 "Blackbirds") and VA-127 at Lemoore, 
California (later relocated to NAS Fallon, Nevada, where it was redesignated VFA-127).  
The NAS Lemoore-based VA-127 was initially a West Coast A-4 replacement 
squadron.  In July 1975, VA-127 became an instrument training squadron.  VA-127 
acquired a DACT role in November 1975 and ceased its instrument training entirely in 
October of 1983.  Its primary mission was now to provide adversary training for West 
Coast attack and light attack squadrons.  In 1987, the squadron was redesignated VFA-
127 "Desert Bogeys"/"Cylons" and moved to NAS Fallon, Nevada and operated VF-45’s 
excess F-5Es.  In late 1988, VFA-127 obtained eight more F-5Es from USAF aggressor 
units.  VFA-127 replaced its A-4s with F/A-18s in 1992, but retained its F-5Es.  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s Top Gun, VF-43 and VF-45 swapped out 
aircraft more than once in an attempt to provide realistic and useful dissimilar adversary 
3 
training.  In 1987, Top Gun exchanged its Northrop F-5Es Tiger II for General Dynamics 
built F-16N Falcons in 1987. 
In June of 1984, VF-45 "Blackbirds" based at NAS Key West took over the 
aircraft and responsibility of the VF-171 detachment and became a full- fledged aggressor 
unit on October 1, 1984.  Their primary role was to provide DACT for the Atlantic 
Fleet’s attack squadrons.  In 1987, VF-45 acquired F-16Ns and by 1989 had 12 of these 
aircraft along with 12 A-4 Skyhawks.  In 1988, VF-45 added six F-16Ns to its inventory 
of adversary aircraft.  During 1988 and 1989, VF-45 loaned six of its F-16Ns to VF-43.  
To counter the loss of some of its F-16Ns, F-5Es aircraft were added to VF-45 in 
December 1989.  The F-5Es operated alongside A-4s, T-2s and F-16N until the F-16Ns 
were retired prematurely in December of 1994 due to fatigue problems.  By November 
1995, VF-45 was still operating seven F-5Es and two F-5Fs, although the squadron was 
scheduled to decommission in 1996.  VFC-12 reservists flying F/A-18s would perform 
the role of East Coast aggressor training. 
In 1985, VF-43 switched from F-5E Tigers to Israeli-supplied F-21A Kfirs.  Since 
the F-21As were provided on a temporary loan, VF-43 switched back to F-5Es in 1989 
when the F-21As were returned to Israel.  These newly acquired F-5Es were obtained 
from the USAF, which was then running down its once- large fleet of Tiger IIs.  VF-43 
provided dissimilar aircraft training until it was deactivated in September of 1993, and 
turned over its responsibilities to VFC-12, a reserve squadron equipped with the F/A-18. 
As a result of budget cuts, the once sizeable fleet of Navy aggressor aircraft was 
cut down to virtually nothing.  In February 1995, Top Gun's F-16Ns were placed in 
storage, leaving only F/A-18 Hornets and F-14 Tomcats.  By the end of 1995, VFA-127 
had 13 F-5Es and a single F-5F, but it too was scheduled for decommissioning in March 
of 1996.  The burden of providing aggressor training rested with the Reserve Squadrons 
VFC-12 at Oceana and VFC-13 at Miramar.4 
In 1994, VFC-12 (Fighting Omars) transitioned to the F/A-18 "Hornet" and 
assumed the leadership role for the successful transition to an all Reserve Navy 
                                                 
4 http://home.att.net/~jbaugher1/f5_28.html Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II for US Navy. January 2, 2000. 
4 
Adversary program.  Although the twin engine supersonic "Hornet" fulfills both fighter 
and attack missions for the Navy, in VFC-12 they are distinctly painted to provide a 
realistic threat simulation and enhance dissimilar air combat training.  Because of its 
maneuverability and superior weapons system, the "Hornet" makes an extremely lethal 
adversary capable of simulating the most sophisticated 4th generation threat aircraft.  
This ability distinguishes VFC-12 as the only dedicated 4th generation adversary 
squadron in the Navy today. 5 
In 1996, VFC-13 (Saints) moved from NAS Miramar, CA, to NAS Fallon, NV, 
and transitioned from 12 F/A-18 to 25 F-5 aircraft.  This transition to the F-5 Tiger II 
adversary aircraft provided Active and Reserve Navy pilots with air-to-air combat 
training against 3rd generation combat aircraft at significant savings to the taxpayer.  
Recent estimates show that the F-5 can be operated at one third of what it costs to operate 
an F/A-18.  Since the decommissioning of VFA-127 (Cylons), VFC-13 is the sole 
remaining west coast Navy aggressor unit.6  Commander, Strike Fighter Wing Pacific 
and Commander, Strike Fighter Wing Atlantic jointly support VFC-13 at Naval Air 
Station, Fallon, Nevada.  The squadron’s mission is to provide adversary training for US 
Navy air wings, regular and reserve fighter and attack squadrons, in addition to US Air 
Force, and US Marine Corps and Canadian forces. 
On February 14, 2001, Naval Air Systems Command awarded a $54 million firm 
fixed price (FFP) contract with one base year and six option years to Sikorsky Support 
Services Inc (SSS Inc.).  This contract requires SSS Inc. to provide organizational, 
intermediate and limited depot level maintenance for Northrop-Grumman F-5 Tiger II 
fighter aircraft based at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada and Marine Corps Air Station, 
Yuma, Arizona.  The US Navy’s Composite Fighter Squadron-13 (VFC-13) and the US 
Marine Corps’ Fighter Training Squadron (VMFT-401) fly the F-5 aircraft.  SSS Inc. is 
responsible for providing the same administrative services and level of support to the 
aggressor squadrons as provided by a military squadron.  The contractor performs all 
                                                 
5 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/navy/vfc-12.htm Pike, John. Fighter Squadron 
Composite Twelve (VFC-12).  December 31, 2002. 
6 http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/f-5.htm Military Analysis Network.  F-5 Freedom 
Fighter/Tiger.  December 27, 1999. 
5 
corrective, organizational, intermediate and limited depot level maintenance under a firm 
fixed price contract.  Maintenance actions involving purchase of direct parts, repair parts, 
and materials not available in the supply system are not covered by a fixed price 
agreement and are performed on a cost reimbursable basis.  In addition, SSS Inc. is 
required to provide transient line functions, which include aircraft fireguard, directing, 
parking, securing, and assisting flight crews for transient Tactical Air Warfare Program 
aircraft.  When aircraft are deployed to other USN, USMC, or USAF bases for training, 
contract personnel will deploy with the aircraft and are responsible for on-aircraft 
servicing, maintenance and additional maintenance support for the aircraft. 
Today, aggressor squadrons are tasked with the mission to provide adversary 
training for US Navy pilots.  In addition, they are challenged with increasing mission 
requirements, limited funding and limited choice of aircraft platforms to provide 
adversary training.  Funding is a significant factor affecting adversary training.  The US 
Navy is seeking methods to provide beneficial training at reduced costs to the warfighter.  
By retiring aircraft from active service, this effort not only frees up funding, but also 
presents an opportunity for aggressor squadrons to upgrade the quality of training 
offered.  The F-5E/F was selected for use as aggressor aircraft because of the similarity in 
size and performance to MiG-21 aircraft.  Furthermore, the cost per flight hour was 
significantly lower than any other tactical aircraft in military service.  F-5E/F aircraft are 
slated to remain in service until 2014.  To date, no replacement aircraft have been 
identified.  The single seat F/A-18A and dual seat F/A-18B Hornets, which have been in 
service since 1983, have been selected for retirement starting in 2003.  By 2007, 65 F/A-
18A and 5 F/A-18B aircraft will be retired.7  Table 1 displays the projected F/A-18A/B 
aircraft retirement schedule through 2012. 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
FA-18A 192 140 140 129 127 127 127 114 92 58 
FA-18B 33 33 33 28 28 28 28 23 23 23 
Table 1.  Projected F/A-18 Aircraft Retirement 
                                                 
7 USNavy Aircraft Inventory Budget Exhibit A-II, Office of the Chief of Naval Aviation, Director Air 
Warfare (N78), 2003 
6 
Proponents of the F/A-18A/B aircraft believe that the F/A-18A/B aircraft is a 
more suitable platform to conduct adversary training.  They favor the F/A-18A/B’s 4th 
generation pulse-doppler radar capabilities over the F-5E/F pulse radar.  The quality of 
the training is determined by the type of aircraft the adversary aircraft are able to simulate 
based on performance characteristics such as radar type.  Proponents of the F-5E/F 
aircraft favor the cost efficiencies of the F-5E/F aircraft over the F/A-18A/B.  Almost 
concurrent with the retirement of the F/A-18A/B aircraft in 2007, NAVAIR’s current F-
5E/F maintenance contract will expire in February 2008, leaving the option open to 
assess the suitability of either the F-5E/F or the F/A-18A/B as the platform to continue 
conducting adversary training for US Navy pilots. 
Should the US Navy continue to use the F-5E/F aircraft to conduct adversary 
training, or should it switch to the F/A-18A/B?  The cost of using the F-5E/F or the F/A-
18A/B aircraft to conduct the VFC-13 mission of adversary training for US Navy pilots is 
the focus of our study. 
7 
II. METHODOLOGY 
This section presents the methodology, including data collection, definition and 
assumptions associated with the CBA of F-5 replacement and contract maintenance.  It 
further identifies the steps of the CBA including the following: (1) specify the set of 
alternative projects, (2) decide whose benefits and costs count, (3) catalogue the impacts 
and select measurement indicators, (4) predict the impacts quantitatively over the life of 
the project, (5) monetize (attach dollar values to) all impacts, (6) discount benefits and 
costs to obtain present values, (7) compute the net present value of each alternative, (8) 
perform sensitivity analysis, and (9) make a recommendation based upon the net present 
value and sensitivity analysis. 
Three alternatives are analyzed in this CBA.  The first alternative involves 
continuing to operate the F-5E/F Tiger aircraft with contractor-supported maintenance by 
awarding another F-5E/F maintenance contract when the current F-5E/F maintenance 
contract expires on February 11, 2008.  The second alternative involves replacing the F-
5E/F with the F/A-18A/B when the current F-5E/F maintenance contract expires in 2008.  
The third alternative involves installation of a 4th generation pulse-doppler radar in the F-
5E/F aircraft by 2008 and awarding another F-5E/F maintenance contract when the  
current F-5E/F maintenance contract expires in 2008.  
Several assumptions are made with regard to all three alternatives.  First, retired 
aircraft including the F-5 and the F/A-18 would be placed into storage at the Air Force’s 
Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center located at David-Monthan Air Force 
Base in Tucson Arizona or sold via the Foreign Military Sales program.  A second 
assumption is that NAVAIR will continue to use contractor-supported maintenance to 
support the aggressor squadrons.  Third, we assume that adequate competition for 
maintenance contracts still exists.  The contracting officer for NAVAIR determined in 
2000 there was adequate competition, four bidders, for the contractor-supported 
maintenance contract.  Therefore, future contract prices will be relatively the same price 
8 
as the existing F-5 maintenance contract.8  Fourth, analyzing three major cost 
components, which make up the Navy’s Flying Hour Program, are sufficient to estimate 
flying hour costs.  Fifth, government furnished infrastructure assets were not analyzed as 
they are common costs incurred by the maintenance activity selected, contractor or 
organic, per the specific T/M/S aircraft.  Finally, when calculating NPV, 12 years will be 
analyzed for this CBA (FY2003-2014) due to the remaining projected 12-year service life 
of the F-5E/F.  Assumptions specific to each alternative follows. 
1.  Alternative One  
First, the maintenance cost for maintaining aging aircraft will continue to 
increase.  Second, the mission for the F-5E/F is to simulate 3rd generation combat aircraft 
such as the MiG-21 which may be flown by an adversary in combat.  Third, the 32 F-
5E/F aircraft purchased from Switzerland in 2002 and are being refurbished by Northrop-
Grumman will have lower maintenance costs than the current aircraft in operation with 
6000+ flight hours.9  Finally, current F-5E/F aircraft will be used as spares to support the 
newly acquired F-5E/F aircraft. 
2.  Alternative Two 
First, spare parts for the F/A 18 A/B are available and will continue to be 
available in the supply system.  Second, excess F/A-18A/B aircraft once retired will be 
used for spare parts and not sold through the FMS program or scrapped.  Third, F/A-
18A/B retirement is still on schedule.  Fourth, the F/A-18 A/B aircraft when retired will 
be fully mission capable.  Fifth, replacing the F-5E/F aircraft with the F/A-18A/B aircraft 
prior to its retirement date is not feasible due to the most degraded F/A-18A/B’s will be 
retired first, thus making these unfit aircraft available to replace the F-5E/F.  Finally, the 
contractor performed maintenance contract will continue until completion in 2008. 
                                                 
8 Bolles, Jay C. NAVAIR PMA225V2.  Telephone interview with LT Jesse Porter, NPS, Monterey, 
California, October 20, 2003 
9 Sirak, Michael. Iraq war delays edelivery of Swiss F-5Es to US Navy. Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 30, 
2003. 
9 
3.  Alternative Three 
First, the maintenance cost for maintaining aging aircraft will continue to 
increase.  Second, the mission for the F-5E/F is to simulate 4th generation combat aircraft 
such as the MiG-29 and Su-27 which may be flown by an adversary in combat.  Third, 
the 32 F-5E/F aircraft purchased from Switzerland in 2002 and are being refurbished by 
Northrop-Grumman will have lower maintenance costs than the current aircraft in 
operation with 6000+ flight hours.  Finally, current F-5E/F aircraft will be used as spares 
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III. IDENTIFY SET OF ALTERNATIVE PROJECTS 
Step 1 of a CBA requires the analyst to specify the set of alternative projects. 10  
There are three alternatives analyzed which will be presented in this CBA.  
a. The first alternative involves continuing to operate the F-5E/F aircraft with 
contractor supported maintenance.  Each of the six option years on the contract would be 
awarded.  After the sixth option has been awarded, a new solicitation would be made by 
NAVAIR for contractor-supported maintenance.   
b. The second alternative involves replacing the F-5E/F with the F/A-18A/B 
aircraft in 2008.  This alternative continues to operate the F-5E/F aircraft with contractor-
supported maintenance until 2008.  Once the last option of the contract is complete, the 
F-5E/F aircraft would be replaced by F/A-18A/B.  By 2008, 63 F/A-18A and five F/A-
18B models will have been retired from the fleet.  A new solicitation would be made by 
NAVAIR for contractor-supported maintenance for the F/A-18A/B. 
c. The third alternative involves installation of a 4th generation pulse-doppler 
radar in the F-5E/F aircraft by 2008 and awarding another F-5E/F maintenance contract 
when the current F-5E/F maintenance contract expires in 2008. 
By allowing the current F-5 maintenance contract to expire in 2008 for all three 
alternatives analyzed, the government avoids paying termination costs, which would 
occur if the government terminated the contract during an option year.  With this 
alternative, NAVAIR has the option to solicit a new contractor-supported maintenance 
contract or modify the existing contract for F/A-18A/B support prior to the F/A-18A/B 
assuming the aggressor mission with contractor supported-maintenance. 
                                                 
10 Boardman, Anthony, et al. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice, Second Edition. New 
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IV. DECIDE WHOSE BENEFITS AND COSTS COUNT 
A. KEY PLAYERS 
Step 2 of a CBA requires the analyst to decide who has standing and whose 
benefits and costs should be counted.11  A stakeholder analysis is an effective tool to 
accomplish this task.  A stakeholder analysis is the initial step in building the 
relationships needed for the success of a participatory change, initiative, or policy.  It also 
aids in assessing the external environment in which the implementation of changes will 
take place.  The analysis should center on which alternative of the CBA represents the  
stakeholders’ ability to influence an alternative.  The stakeholders’ ability to influence an 
alternative can be defined as the ability to influence a decision based on whether the 
stakeholder is a decision maker, customer, or supplier.  This analysis will, at a minimum, 
identify and define the characteristics of key stakeholders and assess the capacity of 
different stakeholders and stakeholder groups to participate in the decision.  Table 2 
provides a summary of key stakeholders and their potential to influence the choice of 
alternatives analyzed in this CBA. 
Stakeholder Influence on the Alternatives 





Table 2.  Stakeholder Analysis12 
                                                 
11 Boardman, Anthony, et al. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice, Second Edition. New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001. 
12 Brydsong, Ricardo John et al. “Transformation of DOD Contract Closeout”: Appendix B.  MBA 
Professional Report.  Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2003. 
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B. KEY STAKEHOLDERS 
The mission of Fighter Squadron Composite 13 (VFC-13) is to provide quality 
adversary training for regular Navy fleet and replacement squadrons and air wings, 
reserve fighter and attack squadrons, USAF and USMC units, and Canadian forces.13  
The pilots of VFC-13 are stakeholders as they are the operators of the subject aircraft.  
The pilots provide an operational viewpoint of the costs and benefits of F-5E/F and F-18 
A/B aircraft.  As operators, they are not the primary decision makers who can implement 
the choice of alternatives of this CBA.  However, as the primary operators, VFC-13 pilots 
have the potential to moderately influence the choice of alternatives.  
Commander Naval Air Force Reserve (CNAR) is the senior type command 
(TYCOM) for all reserve aviation assets used by the United States Navy.  CNAR 
provides operationally ready air squadrons and aircraft carriers to the fleet.  They ensure 
that the reserve aviation fleet squadrons are trained and their aircraft are fit for action, 
backed up by a complex, relentless system of spare parts and maintenance that allows no 
compromise in safety or readiness.14  As the TYCOM, CNAR is a stakeholder of the 
alternatives of this CBA.  Many of the individuals within CNAR are former pilots who 
have flight experience and have assumed administrative duties for the TYCOM.  They 
provide both an operational and administrative viewpoint when addressing costs and 
benefits of F-5E/F and F-18A/B aircraft.  As administrators, they are frequently involved 
in major decision-making processes that CNAR has the potential to significantly 
influence such as the choice of alternatives for this CBA. 15 
The mission of Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) is to serve the 
Warfighter by bringing technology to bear on behalf of defending the United States 
through Naval Aviation and wherever US Navy advanced technologies provide value.  
NAVAIR is driven to use Naval Aviation Technologies to solve the problems of modern 
                                                 
13 Fighter Squadron Composite 13 (VFC-13).  Accessed November 13, 2003.  
http://www.fallon.navy.mil/VFC_13.HTM 
14 Commander Naval Air Forces Reserve. Accessed November 16, 2003. 
http://reserves.navy.mil/Reserves/Public/Staff/Centers/Air/WelcomeAboard/default.htm?LGUID={3FCAE
1B7-D2B5-4A12-B94D-154A810F529E} 
15 Suggs, William LCDR. VFC-13, Operations Officer. Telephone interview with LCDR Rob 
DeGuzman. NPS, Monterey, California, November 14, 2003. 
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warfare and to create new capabilities that strengthen our nation's position within it.16  As 
the Naval Air Systems Command for the US Navy, NAVAIR is a stakeholder and 
primary decision maker for the Navy concerning Naval Aviation.  Hence, NAVAIR has 
the potential to significantly influence on the choice of alternatives of this CBA. 17 
As elected officials, Congress is a stakeholder of this CBA.  Congress has the 
authority to authorize and appropriate funds as well as pass and enact legislation.  Thus, 
Congress has the potential to significantly influence the choice of alternatives of this 
CBA. 
Government contractors have a high interest in being awarded government 
contracts as they are motivated by profit.  Thus, contractors are stakeholders of this CBA.  
The current NAVAIR F-5E/F (VFC-13) and F/A-18A/B (NSWAC) maintenance 
contracts had several responsive and responsible bidders.  Market research by NAVAIR 
indicates there will still be several responsible and responsive contractors to perform 
maintenance for either the F-5E/F or F/A-18A/B aircraft when the existing F-5E/F 
maintenance contract expires in 2008.18  Hence, in a near perfect competitive market 
where sellers have minimal influence over buyers because there are several sellers to 
select from, contractors have the potential to minimally influence the choice of 
alternatives in this CBA.  
                                                 
16 About NAVAIR.  Accessed November 16, 2003. 
http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.default 
17 Bolles, Jay C. NAVAIR PMA225V2.  Telephone interview with LT Jesse Porter, NPS, Monterey, 
California, October 20, 2003 
18 Bolles, Jay. C. NAVAIR PMA225V2.  Telephone interview with LT Jesse Porter, NPS, Monterey, 
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V. CATALOG IMPACTS AND SELECT MEASUREMENT 
INDICATORS 
Step 3 of a CBA requires the analyst to list the physical impacts of the alternatives 
as benefits or costs and to specify the impacts’ measurement units.19  Impacts and 
measurement indicators for the three alt ernatives analyzed for this CBA are summarized 
























































































Benefits     










                                                 
19 Boardman, Anthony, et al. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice, Second Edition. New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001. 
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Table 3.  Impacts and Units of Measurement Indicators 
A. FLYING HOUR PROGRAM 
The Department of the Navy (DON) Operations and Maintenance (Active) and 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) (Reserve) appropriations include billions of dollars 
each fiscal year for the Flying Hour Program (FHP) under the Air Operations portion.  
The FHP includes flight hours for both the Navy and the Marine Corps.  These funds are 
divided among four major claimants (CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, 
CINCUSNAVEUR, and COMNAVRESFOR).  The funds are used primarily to pay for 
fuel, repair parts, maintenance labor, and miscellaneous associated costs such as 
Temporary Duty (TAD).  The Navy and Marine Corps use the FHP to support day-to-day 
flight operations and maintenance associated with Naval aviation.   
The budgetary elements, grouped by Aviation Fleet Maintenance, (OFC-50) have 
direct impact on determining the cost per flying hour for each type of aircraft.  This CBA 
will focus on the following key budgetary cost elements:  Fuel (FF), Maintenance 
Consumables (FM), Contract Maintenance (FW), and Aviation Depot Level Repairables 
(FA), Costs.  These FHP direct flight hour costs (FF, FA, FW/FM) will be the focus of 
this CBA as these are the most significant costs of the FHP.  In accordance with OFC-50, 
Maintenance and Contract costs will be grouped together as one category of direct costs 
titled Maintenance/Contract (FM/FW) costs for analysis purposes of this CBA. 
The Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Cost (VAMOSC) 
system provides Operating and Support (O&S) flying hour costs for the FHP, including 
all aspects of Naval Aviation from high- level aggregate reports to detailed reports on 
19 
individual systems during specific time periods.  The VAMOSC program was used to 
obtain actual annual costs incurred given the number of flight hours by both the F-5E/F 
and F/A-18A/B aircraft types during FY02.  A VAMOSC extract of the flying hour 
programs direct costs (FF, FA, FW/FM) are included in appendix B.  For the purpose of 
this CBA, Navy aircraft, flight hours and costs were used to make comparisons between 
platforms.  To gain a better appreciation of the Navy’s FHP and the direct flight hour 
costs elements which feed the VAMOSC system, a brief overview of the FHP process is 
warranted. 
1. Overview 
As a brief overview of the FHP process, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) for Air Warfare (N-78) is responsible for formulating the annual funding required 
for each aircraft type/model/series (T/M/S).  The primary budget tool utilized is the 
Operational Plan (OP-20).  Throughout the year, the N-78 staff works closely with their 
counterparts at the major claimant level, such as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet 
(CINCPACFLT) and their Air Type Commander (TYCOM) CNAR, to monitor FHs 
flown.  The TYCOM then distributes quarterly grants to each squadron under his 
command based on the upcoming requirements.  On a monthly basis, fiscal year to date 
(FYTD) feedback from the squadrons executing the FHP are collected, analyzed, and fed 
back up the chain of command to assess how costs for Fuel, AVDLRs, and 
Contracts/Maintenance are tracking relative to the OP-20.  The TYCOM then certifies the 
obligations and these figures are used to cost out the year’s requirements at the end of the 
fiscal year.  Furthermore, other variables, such as an inflation factor, an aircraft-aging 
factor, and other program change factors are added into the cost calculation.  These data 
points are also used to justify future annual funding requirements.  Naval Aviation is 
programmed, budgeted, and funded to fly approximately 1.2 million hours each year.  
This number does not include undergraduate flight training or Research, Development 
Test and Evaluation flight hour requirements.   The FHP provides resources for Navy and 
Marine aviation forces to, train in prescribed readiness areas, perform flights in support 
of required maintenance/logistics efforts, conduct routine deployed operations, and 
conduct warfare and warfare support operations. 
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2. Flight Hours  
The source documents for the basic FHP calculation of hours are: Training and 
Readiness Matrix (CNAF), Marine Aviation Campaign Plan (HQMC APP), Aircraft 
Program Data File (N780G), Required Operational Capability/Potential Operational 
Environment, Documents (N780 ROs), and direct fleet input for Fleet Air Support and 
the Reserves. 
3. Flight Hour Costs  
Both direct and indirect costs are calculated for the FHP.  Direct costs include 
fuel, AVDLRs, and contracts/maintenance (contract maintenance and maintenance 
consumables) costs.  Fuel costs are incurred by the Navy in order to provide JP-8 jet fuel 
at the price established by the Defense Energy Supply Center.  The Navy Petroleum 
Office sets the expenditure price for all Navy and Marine Corps activities to report fuel 
usage.  AVDLR costs for the CBA include AVDLR cost of goods, AVDLR cost 
recovery, Commercial Aircraft Rework and Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework.  
Contract costs include contractor logistics support, intermediate level civilian and 
contractor support.  Maintenance consumables costs include the costs of the maintenance 
consumable repair part.  Indirect costs include squadron TAD, fleet simulator support, 
Transportation of equipment (TOT), Commercial Air Services, NMCI and various other 
costs.  They are not part of the OP-20, but are budgeted under special interest code FO.  
Indirect flight hour costs are not included in this CBA as they are not as significant of a 
cost as the FHP direct costs are. 
4. Cost per Hour 
Direct costs are calculated on a cost per hour basis.  The baseline for each budget 
is the last complete year of certified fleet costs.  The baseline is escalated across the 
Fiscal Year Defense Plan using Working Capital Fund rates to accommodate the 
changing cost of spare parts to the fleet.  AVDLR costs are further adjusted for the 
anticipated change in demand using a Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) formula 
developed during a recent aging aircraft study.  AVDLRs and maintenance consumables 
are further adjusted for additional planned growth as identified by NAVAIR/NAVICP-P 
using the Cost Adjustment and Visibility Tracking System (CAVTS).  Likewise, 
AVDLRs and maintenance consumables are adjusted for anticipated savings due to a 
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variety of reliability improvements.  Contract maintenance costs are provided by PMA-
207 in support of C-12s, C-20s, C-9s, UC-35s, C-40s, C-26s, and Adversary (F-5s/F-
16s)20. 
B. MAINTENANCE CONTRACT ISSUES 
The current F-5E/F maintenance contract is a fixed price, award-option incentive 
type contract with one base year and six option years.  In order to adequately analyze the 
three alternative options involved in this CBA, a comprehensive understanding of 
pertinent contracting issues and cost associated with each alternative is required.  
Alternative one of continuing the status quo with the F-5E/F maintenance contract entails 
to continue awarding each option and reissuing an F-5E/F contract solicitation for full 
and open competition at the end of the life of the contract in 2008.  Alternative two of 
replacing the F-5E/F with the retired F/A-18A/B by 2008 also entails to continue award 
of each F-5E/F award option until the end of contract life, but issues a new contract 
solicitation for full and open competition for the replacement F/A-18A/B aircraft.  The 
third alternative of installing a 4th generation pulse-doppler radar in the F-5E/F’s by 2008 
reissues an F-5E/F contract solicitation for full and open competition at the end of the life 
of the contract in 2008.  By waiting to reissue a new aircraft maintenance contract at the 
end of the current F-5E/F maintenance contract, all three alternatives mitigate risk and 
reduce cost by forgoing costly contract termination costs, contract claims, and disputes by 
the government unilaterally declining to award the next option year.  Furthermore, all 
three alternatives also have contract closeout costs associated with the F-5E/F contract.  
In the context of this discussion, mitigating risk is defined as reducing and preventing 
excessive cost and cost creep. 
The following section provides a background of the current F-5E/F maintenance 
contract, as well as discusses the various contract issues and risks involved with contract 
terminations, claims, disputes, appeals, contract closeouts, and contract solicitations.  The 
following discussion provides a framework of determining which contract methods offer 
                                                 
20 Fowler, A., Flying Hour Program, Paper used for annual updates. Alexandria, Virginia. August 12, 
2003. 
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the least risk and cost, which ultimately led to our determination of our three alternative 
options for the F-5E/F and F/A-18A/B CBA. 
1. F-5E/F Maintenance Contract 
Program Manager Air 225 (PMA225) is delegated authority from and is 
ultimately responsible and accountable to the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command 
(COMNAVAIRSYSCOM).  PMA225 has been tasked by COMNAVAIRSYSCOM to 
provide contract maintenance, logistics management, and administration in support of the 
F-5E/F SOW, which provides the concept, performance specifications, and requirements 
for that support.  An abbreviated F-5E/F SOW has been provided as appendix C.  The 
most important contractor performance criteria is to provide safe flyable aircraft to 
complete the Navy’s daily flight schedule. 
The services described in the F-5E/F SOW are performed in accordance with 
OPNAVINST 4790.2 series.  The contractor provides and maintains organizational (O), 
intermediate (I), limited depot (D) level aircraft maintenance, management, logistics 
support services and other services as specified in the F-5E/F SOW for aircraft based at 
Fighter Composite Reserve Thirteen (VFC-13) Fallon NV, and Marine Fighter Squadron 
Training (VMFT-401) in Yuma AZ (approximately 32 F-5E, and 4 F-5F).  
The Organizational, Intermediate, and limited Depot level aircraft maintenance 
the contractor provides includes associated support equipment, power plants, airframes, 
aviation life support systems, electronic and electrical instruments, armament radar/fire 
control and flight line services in order to meet the flying programs of each activity and 
its daily mission requirements.  Organizational, Intermediate, and limited Depot level 
maintenance is maintenance which is performed at the site where the aircraft are 
permanently assigned or on temporary detachment.  The contractor ensures that aircraft 
are maintained to achieve maximum utilization of all assets.  The contractor is fully 
responsible for the correction of all damage and defects, which are directly attributed to 
the Contractor’s performance or actions under the F-5E/F contract21. 
                                                 
21 Naval Tactical Air Warfare Aircraft Maintenance F-5 E/F Statement of Work Attachment 1, 
N00019-01-C-0109, 2001. 
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a. Award-Option Incentive Contract  
The current F-5E/F maintenance contract is an award option incentive, 
fixed-priced contract.  The award-option incentive is described in FAR 17.2.  The award-
option incentive is a unique contracting method in that it rewards the contractor by 
extending the contract without competition.  Under an award-option incentive, a 
government team monitors and evaluates the contactor’s performance against the 
performance standards of the contract and decides whether the contractor’s performance 
was good enough to merit an extension through exercising the next award option year.  
The extension is conditioned upon the government’s continuing need for the service and 
availability of funds. 
A true award-option incentive rewards the contractor with a contract 
extension through an additional option.  An award option is a unilateral right of the 
government, and a contractor is not entitled to the exercise of an option.  The contractor 
bears the risk of not being awarded the next option year based on contractor performance 
issues, availability of funds, and the best interests of the government.  If the contracting 
officer determines that it is in the best interest of the government to not award the next 
option year, the contracting officer does not have to terminate for convenience and can 
simply close the contract at the end of the base or option years.  
Agencies have used award-option incentives when acquiring a variety of 
services.  The incentive has been used with several different pricing and delivery 
arrangements such as fixed-price as in the case of the current F-5E/F maintenance 
contract, cost-reimbursement, indefinite-delivery/indefinite quantity, and requirements. 
The award-option incentive may provide a solution to one of the most 
vexing shortcomings of contractual incentives; they do not work as advertised.  The 
contractual incentives described in FAR Part 16 are all profit incentives by rewarding 
excellent performance by paying more money.  However, since the early 1960’s, 
researchers have concluded that such profit incentives do not produce the results 
predicted by incentive theory.  If the researchers are correct and contractual incentives 
have had little effect on contract performance, then the award-option incentive is a 
promising development.  The award-option incentive rewards a contractor with additional 
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business, which satisfies four of the long-term goals identified by the Logistics 
Management Institute in a 1968 study: (1) enhanced company image and reputation, (2) 
increased future business, (3) retention of skilled personnel, and (4) the maintenance of 
an allocation base for fixed costs.  The award-option incentive gives a contractor a 
chance to earn a more all-encompassing reward than short term profit dollars by 
rewarding a long-term business relationship. 
Aside from the potential for motivating contractors to perform excellently, 
there are at least three other advantages to using award-option incentives to establish 
long-term business relationships.  These include increased operational efficiency and 
effectiveness, inc4reased contractor investment, and reduced acquisition transaction 
costs.  A potential disadvantage of a long-term business relationship is the possibility that 
the agents of the contracting parties will begin to conduct business on a personal basis 
instead of a proper professional basis.  People who have come to know and like one 
another in the course of time may relax their standards and overlook performance 
deficiencies for the sake of their personal relations 22.   
2. Contract Termination 
A contracting officer has the authority to terminate a contract by either a 
termination for convenience (T4C) or a termination for default (T4D).  FAR Part 49 
grants the authority and responsibility to contracting officers to terminate contracts in 
whole or in part for the convenience of the government or for default, defines the duties 
of the contractor and the contracting officer, and establishes general procedures for the 
settlement of terminated contracts and settlement agreements.  After issuing a notice of 
termination, the contracting officer is responsible for negotiating any settlement with the 
contractor, including a no cost settlement if appropriate.  Hence, contract terminations 
can be a costly decision for the government and should be exercised only if it is in the 
best interest of the government. 
A T4C provides the government the ability to terminate a contract in whole or 
part that is made obsolete or is no longer in the best interest of the government.  A T4C is 
                                                 
22 Edwards, Vernon J. Award-Term: The newest Incentive.  Contract Management, February 2001. 
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not a normal commercial business practice and is unique to government contracting.  The 
governments right to terminate for convenience is based upon inclusion of the 
termination clause (FAR part 52.249) and agreement amongst parties, by operation of 
law, by cancellation of a contract, and also by breach of contract in the event an improper 
termination for default occurs.  Under a termination for convenience, the government 
agrees to make the contractor whole by reimbursing all reasonable and allocable costs 
incurred for performance up to the time of termination, certain continuing costs (post 
termination), settlement expenses, and under fixed price contracts, maintaining the same 
profit level on work performed up to the termination for convenience decision unless the 
contractor would have incurred a loss.  Furthermore, the contractor is not allowed profit 
on settlement expenses nor is the contractor entitled to anticipatory profits. 
The other type of termination is a T4D.  The government has a right to terminate 
for default if the contractor fails to deliver the contract supplies or perform the services 
on time, to make progress so as to endanger performance on the contract, or to perform 
any of the other provisions of the contract.  Usually the contracting officer issues a cure 
notice allowing a contractor to fix the termination for default deficiencies. 
After issuing a notice of termination, the contracting officer is responsible for 
negotiating any settlement with the contractor, including a no-cost settlement if 
appropriate.  Auditors and contracting officers promptly schedule and complete audit 
reviews and negotiations, giving particular attention to the need for timely action on all 
settlements involving small business concerns.  For the F-5E/F maintenance contract, the 
decision to exercise the unilateral right to terminate for convenience may bear some cost 
to the government and will most likely lead to contractor claims and disputes.  
Fortunately, the F-5E/F maintenance contract contains award-option incentives, which 
allows the government to forgo potential costs associated with termination for 
convenience by simply opting to not award the next option year.  Yet, the unilateral 
decision to not award the next option year can only occur at the end of a given option 
year23.   
                                                 
23 Yoder, CDR E. Cory. MN3315 Acquisition Management and Contract Administration Course 
Slides. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2002-2003. 
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3. Claims Management 
If the government elects to terminate for convenience or if the contract is in 
breach of contract and the government has no recourse but to terminate for default, then 
the contracting officer must negotiate settlement costs for work performed up to the time 
of contract termination.  If the contractor disagrees with the contracting officer’s proposal 
for negotiating the termination for convenience settlement, then dispute proceedings 
commence.  There are four methods to resolving claims: direct negotiation, alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR), issuing a COFD, and the appellate process. 
a. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
FAR Part 33 encourages the contracting officer to use of ADR to the 
maximum extent practical, except in cases of fraud, penalties or forfeiture.  ADR 
techniques involve conciliation, facilitation, mediation, partnering, fact- finding, mini-
trial, and arbitration.  When using ADR, the contractor is required to certify all claims 
regardless of amount.  Also, contracting officers and contractors must provide written 
explanations if they reject the other parties’ request for ADR procedures. 
b. Disputes & Contracting Officer’s Final Decision 
The contracting officer serves in a dual capacity in the dispute process:  he 
is the government’s advocate in conducting negotiations with the contractor, and he is a 
quasi- judicial official when rendering the final decision under the disputes clause.  
Furthermore, it should be the contracting officer’s priority to dispose of dispute matters 
through negotiated settlements that bind the parties.  Negotiated settlements are always 
the preferred method, and it is the government’s policy to settle all claims by mutual 
agreement at the contracting officer’s level, without litigation for the following reasons: 
saves time and money, precludes extensive personnel involvement, preserves conciliatory 
partnership, and often achieves the same end state.  If the two parties cannot come to a 
negotiated, binding settlement, the contracting officer must issue his contracting officer’s 
final decision (COFD). 
The COFD serves two functions: it is the final settlement offer of the 
government, and it is a prerequisite to the contractor’s use of adjudication under the 
contract disputes act.  After the COFD, the contractor has the right to appeal the COFD to 
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the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) or to the court of federal claims 
(CFC).  ADR after COFD does not constitute a reconsideration of the final decision.  
Timing is crucial as statutory limits are placed on both the contracting officer and the 
contractor for submission and disposition.  COFD is the first step in the litigation process.  
The statute requires that contracting officer issue a COFD on claims of $100K or less 
within 60 days from receipt of a written request but can be deferred if negotiations are 
being conducted.  Similarly, the contracting officer shall, within 60 days of receipt of a 
submitted, certified claim over $100K, issue a decision or notify the contractor of the 
time within which a decision will be issued.  The decision of a contracting officer shall be 
issued within a reasonable time, taking into account such factors as size and complexity 
of the claim and adequacy of information.  If the contracting officer does not issue a 
timely decision, the contractor has two alternatives: request ASBCA or CFC to order the 
contracting officer to make a decision, or process the case as an appeal against failure to 
make a decision.  Courts have held that any failure by the contracting officer to issue a 
decision within the period required would be deemed to be a decision by the contracting 
officer denying the claim and will authorize the commencement of the appeal. 
c. Appeals 
The contractor must file in writing a notice of appeal within 90 days after 
receipt of a valid COFD.  The appeal must express discontent with the final decision; 
state an intention to seek review by higher authority; identify the contracting officer, 
agency, or department location; contain contract number and description of requirements; 
and state the decision from which relief is sought.  Upon receipt of an appeal, the 
contracting officer should contact legal and have a trial by attorney assigned, begin to 
assemble the appeal “rule four file”, and continue to finance ongoing performance in the 
contract.  Furthermore, within 30 days from receipt of the complaint, the contracting 
officer should file an answer to the appeal with the ASBCA denying the allegations 
completely, deny in part, claim lack of information to form belief, and/or reply that 
allegations are legal conclusions rather than statement of fact.  Regardless, the contractor 
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must continue performance and comply with the COFD pending final decision on 
appeal.24 
When the government is faced with the option to terminate the F-5E/F 
contract before the end of the negotiated option years, the contracting officer must 
determine what is in the best interest for the government, namely to mitigate risk.  
Fortunately, the government can forgo the costs associated with contractor claims, 
disputes and appeals by not terminating for convenience and instead elect to not award 
the next option year for the contract.  The contractor does not have a legal recourse to 
support a claim or dispute due to the legalities and very nature of award-option incentive 
contracts.  The contractor takes the risk of not being awarded follow on option years of 
an award-option incentive contract when they initially agree to perform services for the 
government.  In this case, the contract simply ends and contract closeout procedures 
occur. 
4. Contract Closeout 
Contract closeout occurs when the procurement contracting officer signs the DD 
Form 1594 contract completion record or any other prescribed completion statement.  
Several areas must be considered when closing a contract: disposition of government 
property, reconciliation of unliquidated damages, establishment of final billing rates, and 
patent reports.  Contrary to popular belief, contract closeout does not have to be the dregs 
of the acquisition cycle.  In fact, timely closeout can mean real-time dollar savings to the 
organization and a wealth of satisfaction in shipping the files off to their final resting 
place.  It is also a myth that closeout begins with physical completion of the contract.  
Contract closeout actually begins during acquisition planning.  How well it is managed at 
that stage in the process makes a significant difference in the difficulty of the individual 
contract closeout steps.  In practice, closeout is managed two very different ways.  The 
first is proactive, planning ahead for the tasks and documentation, which will be part of 
the closure process.  The second is more common, old dogs with missing or moth-eaten 
                                                 
24 Yoder, CDR E. Cory. MN3315 Acquisition Management and Contract Administration Course 
Slides. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2002-2003. 
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records and the retirement 12 months earlier of everyone even remotely connected with 
the contract action. 
Contract closeout usually follows DD Form 1597, contract closeout checklist.  All 
contracts for closeout must meet the condition that the contract be physically complete in 
that the government must have inspected and accepted all deliverables, all options if any 
have expired, or a notice of complete contract termination has been issued to the 
contractor.  Often times, there are contract closeout obstacles to be that the contracting 
officer must overcome before proceeding.  For instance, if final indirect cost rates are not 
determined, Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audit reports to verify rates are not 
complete, if outstanding or unresolved claims are present, or if costs associated with a 
termination settlement are not determined, then the government will not be able to readily 
closeout the contract. 
Specific time frames for contract closeout are dependent upon contract type and 
dollar value.  Firm-fixed price contracts not within the simplified acquisition procurement 
threshold require contract closeout within six months of receipt of physical completion 
and final payment or after a termination by the contracting officer is issued.  Contracts 
with an indirect cost rate, such as cost type contracts, require contract closeout within 
thirty-six months in which the contracting officer receives evidence of physical 
completion or a termination for convenience is issued.  All other contracts require 
contract closeout within twenty months from receipt of evidence of physical 
completion25. 
5. Contract Solicitation 
As for the F-5E/F maintenance contract, after the end of performance of a contract 
and contract closeout procedures thus commence, contract solicitation procedures occur 
for the new maintenance contract.  As stated previously, all three alternatives of this CBA 
involve solicitation costs for issuing either a new F-5E/F or F/A-18A/B maintenance 
contract.  Risks for each alternative involve the contract solicitation costs as well as the 
costs of actual contract performance.  When issuing a new F-5E/F or F/A-18A/B 
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maintenance contract, mitigating risk during the post-award phase can be effectively 
accomplished by following the correct procedures during the pre-award phase.  Several 
of these actions are listed in the FAR, others are listed through best business practices and 
experience.  The key to success is locked in the beginning during the development of the 
Source Selection Process and the formation of the Integrated Product Team (IPT), 
including the Program Manager and Contract Manager.  The Source Selection Process 
involves forecasting the steps to be taken during the acquisition process; conducting 
careful and thorough market research; defining requirements and developing the request 
for proposal (RFP); communicating requirements through publishing the RFP; 
developing proposal factors and evaluating proposals; source selection; and finally 
award. 
a. Acquisition Planning 
Proper acquisition planning for both the F-5E/F and F/A-18A/B 
maintenance contracts is integral in ensuring risk mitigation during the post-award phase.  
FAR Part 7 states that acquisition planning is the process by which the efforts of all 
personnel responsible for an acquisition are coordinated and integrated through a 
comprehensive plan for fulfilling the agency need in a timely manner and at a reasonable 
cost.  Acquisition planning is important in mitigating risk during the post-award phase in 
that it makes good business sense: it coordinates efforts of IPT members, builds 
commitment of members, uncovers pitfalls, ensures realistic timeframes link actions 
required with specific milestones and times, and communicates approach. 
Forecasting contracting steps such as plans, budgets, and schedules is an 
essential part of acquisition planning and reducing risk during the post-award phase for 
the following reasons:  integral to the integrated process team; helps develop realistic 
plans, budgets, and schedules; helps develop long rage strategies; may recommend 
contract bundling; incorporates lessons learned from previous acquisitions; ensures 
acquisition milestones are established and adhered to; and conducts market research. 
b. Market Research 
The first step in source selection planning for both the F-5E/F and F/A-
18A/B maintenance contracts is for the IPT to conduct thorough and exhaustive market 
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research.  Market Research is defined as a process used to collect, organize, maintain, 
analyze and present data for the purpose of maximizing the capabilities, technology, and 
competitive forces of the market place to meet an organizations needs for supplies and 
services.  In order to mitigate risk during the post-award phase, market research should be 
accomplished not only in the beginning of but also throughout the entire acquisition 
process.  By performing market research throughout the entire contracting pre and post-
award phase, the contracting officer will be kept current on factors that can directly 
impact the contract.  In fact, market surveillance, a subset of market research, is defined 
as continuing market research to determine availability of products, reliability of sources, 
extent of competition, range of product characteristics, market acceptability, price trends, 
current market prices, and availability of distribution systems.   
FAR Part 10 states that market research is mandatory, and further states 
that agencies must conduct market research before developing new requirements 
documents and before soliciting offers for acquisitions above the simplified threshold, or 
below, if adequate information is not available and the cost is justified.  Also, FAR Part 
12 states that market research should be conducted to determine whether commercial 
items could meet the requirements of the product.  Commercial items in themselves can 
greatly mitigate post-award phase risk by selecting an item that has been proven by the 
marketplace and usually includes warranties, thereby eliminating developmental costs 
and rework costs to the government. 
Other important points of conducting market research to reduce risk 
during the post-award phase include getting intimately acquainted with the market the 
product or service applies to.  In other words, it is beneficial to know the practices of 
those markets.  In general, the contracting officer should; know the market’s political and 
financial factors, capacities and capabilities, economic profiles, competition in the market 
place, substitutes and complements, longevity and sustainability, supportability and 
producibility, and determine the extent of supporting socio-economic programs.  
Becoming well acquainted with these factors during the market research phase will arm 
the IPT with the correct knowledge of the requirements to be included in the solicitation, 
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the approximate amount of competitors who will become likely offerors, and the 
longevity and sustainability of the product or service. 
c. Source Selection Plan 
Conducting thorough source selection planning can greatly mitigate risk 
during the post-award phase for both the F-5E/F and F/A-18A/B maintenance contracts.  
The source selection plan specifies how the source selection activities will be organized, 
initiated, and conducted, provides a blueprint for conducting the source selection, 
determines the proposed pre-solicitation activities, and summarizes the acquisition 
strategy.  The purpose of the source selection plan is to provide essential information to 
the contracting officer for development of RFP sections L and M of the solicitation, to 
serve as a written guide for conducting the evaluation and analysis of proposals for the 
source selection team, and to ensure that offerors are aware of how proposals will be 
evaluated and what information must be included in the proposals.  Written guidelines for 
developing evaluation factors and conducting evaluations of proposals ensure that 
evaluation criteria do not change between the time the solicitation is released and the time 
offers are evaluated, thereby minimizing risk of protest during the post-award phase.  
Source selection plan goals to minimize risk during the acquisition phase include 
maximizing competition, minimizing the complexity of the solicitation, evaluation, 
selection decision, ensuring impartial evaluation, and ensuring selection of the proposal 
with the highest degree of realism. 
d. Defining Requirements & RFP Development 
The specifications of the RFP directly determine the extent of competition, 
procurement technique, and the contract type that can be used for both the F-5E/F and 
F/A-18A/B maintenance contracts.  Specifications can be stated in terms of performance, 
functional, or design requirements.  When performance specifications are used, the 
contractor bears most of the risk; when design specifications are used, the government 
bears most of the risk.  Yet, when determining specifications to mitigate risk, the correct 
decision is to choose the type of specification that matches the nature of the need and the 
market available to satisfy such needs (versus arbitrarily choosing performance 
specifications to allocate more risk to the contractor when it is more appropriate to 
choose design specifications). 
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The following steps minimize risk when defining requirements for the 
purpose of providing feedback of the relevancy and realism of requirements and 
specifications:  use IPTs early in the process; issue draft solicitations and RFPs; capitalize 
on industry conferences; conduct and use market research; conduct preproposal 
conferences; plan and execute a site visit; use commercial source standards; and use 
creativity and imagination.  Use of these risk minimizing steps will encourage 
prospective offerors to evaluate and challenge all elements of the acquisition, propose 
methods to reduce proposal and contract costs, provide feedback on the proposed pricing 
arrangement, and identify requirements that account for a high percentage of the total 
cost. 
e. Determining Contract Type 
During the acquisition planning phase, the approach and methodology for 
determining the procurement contract type is established for both the F-5E/F and F/A-
18A/B maintenance contracts.  After conducting market research, developing the source 
selection plan, and clearly defining requirements, the contracting officer, with the 
approval of the Source Selection Authority (SSA) and the Source Selection Advisory 
Council (SSAC), determines the type of contract to be used for the product or service.  
Determining the correct contract type is based on several factors, including the 
requirements of the product and the maturity of the product or service to be procured.  
Also, understanding the functions and purpose of a contract for determining the correct 
contract type can mitigate risk during the post-award phase.  The purpose of a contract is 
to provide five key functions: evidence of agreement, framework of accountability, risk 
allocation, payment function, and a motivation function.  For mitigating risk purposes, 
risk allocation and motivation are the most significant.  As the contract is a risk allocation 
device, risk can be allocated through cost, schedule and performance.  Also, determining 
whether the contract will be fixed price (performance) or cost reimbursement (design) 
should be based on the requirements and the maturity of the product or service.  Bottom 




f. Communicating Requirements and Facilitating Competition 
Publicizing the RFP through various media will directly enhance 
competition, thereby mitigating risk during the post-award phase for both the F-5E/F and 
F/A-18A/B maintenance contracts.  FAR Part 5 states that contracting officers shall 
publicize proposed contract actions in order to increase competition, broaden industry 
participation, and assist small business concerns.  Methods of publicizing include posting 
in FEDBIZOPS, public places, media announcements, trade journals, and various 
electronic bulletin board sources. 
g. Evaluation Factors 
An excellent method to provide fair and adequate competition and 
minimize protests for both the F-5E/F and F/A-18A/B maintenance contracts is to 
develop clear, distinct evaluation factors.  A good rule of thumb is to have evaluation 
factors which are few in number, true discriminators with significant differences between 
proposals expected, consistent with the source selection plan, definable and measurable if 
quantitative or realistic if qualitative, predictive of a successful procurement, and tailored 
to the acquisition.  When using the trade-off process, solicitations shall state whether 
evaluation factors other than cost or price are significantly more important, 
approximately equal to, or significant less important than cost or price.  Developing the 
evaluation criteria is an iterative process that should involve all members of the IPT, 
including the contracting officer, program manager, and the SSAC and SSEB. 
Determining the nature of the evaluation factors will reduce risk during 
the post-award phase.  Despite FAR Part 15.605 stating that past performance, quality, 
and environmental issues shall be evaluated, considered, or addressed in every 
acquisition, it would be foolhardy not to.  For instance, the government must record 
evaluations of contractor’s past performance and make the information available to other 
agencies in order to improve the ability to predict quality of future work.  Also, past 
performance evaluation criteria provide contractors with a powerful incentive to improve, 
thereby mitigating the risk of non-performance during the post-award phase.  
Furthermore, the evaluation factor of quality ensures the longevity and sustainability 
concept of a product or service, thereby mitigating risk.  Finally, environmental factors 
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are considered when appropriate to ensure government compliance with environmental 
regulations, thereby minimizing risk of hefty fines during the post-award phase. 
h. Proposal Evaluation 
The proposal evaluation process for both the F-5E/F and F/A-18A/B 
maintenance contracts, if conducted properly, includes several steps that can mitigate risk 
during the post-award phase.  The purpose of proposal evaluation is to assess the quality 
of each offer and determine the capability of the offeror to perform.  The Source 
Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB), under the direction of the SSAC and the SSA, 
usually conducts the proposal evaluation.  The first step is to have all SSEB members 
conduct pre-proposal training.  Most SSEB members are technical experts of the product 
or service being acquisitioned and need comprehensive preproposal training to ensure the 
proposals are evaluated against the specifications (RFP Section C) and evaluation factors 
(RFP Section M) in a consistent and documented manner.  Ground rules for proposal 
evaluation procedures include evaluating factors and subfactors by the same person, 
documenting each offerors strengths, weaknesses, deficiencies, and uncertainties against 
the factors and subfactors and not against other proposals, and ensuring consistency and 
fairness.  These evaluations are summarized in a summary evaluation report that is 
forwarded to the SSAC and SSA along with the recommendation of contract award.  
Hence, using the evaluation factors, subfactors, and applicable evaluation standards will 
facilitate an equitable, impartial, and comprehensive evaluation against the solicitation 
requirements.26 
i. Source Selection & Award 
Mitigating the risk of not choosing the best value offeror or reducing the 
risk of protests from unsuccessful offerors can be accomplished by carefully following 
the FAR mandated procedures of the source selection and award phase for both the F-
5E/F and F/A-18A/B maintenance contracts.  After the SSEB conducts the proposal 
evaluation, either the SSA or SSAC will compare them to determine the proposal(s) that 
represent the best value based on the stated evaluation factors.  In tradeoff acquisitions, 
the comparison process is complex and depending upon the evaluation factors, the SSA 
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may exercise a significant degree of judgment in selecting the successful offeror(s).  
While the SSEB evaluation ratings are merely labels, the SSA must not base his decision 
on these summary indicators.  The SSA must base his decision on a detailed comparison 
of the strengths and weaknesses of the competing proposals.  If the lowest-priced 
proposal is not the most superior in terms of non-cost factors, a tradeoff analysis is 
required.  The SSA must make the source selection decision using rational and 
independent judgment based on a comparative analysis of the proposals.  The analysis 
must be consistent with the evaluation factors and process described in the RFP and SSP.  
Beyond this, the SSA has broad discretion in making the source selection decision.  The 
SSA may not rely on the evaluation ratings and scores alone.  To determine which 
proposal provides the best value, the SSA must analyze the differences between 
competing proposals.  This analysis must be based on the facts and circumstances of the 
specific acquisition.  The SSA is not bound by the SSEB or SSAC’s rankings or scores as 
long as the SSA has a rational basis for the differing opinions.  Hence, mitigating risk 
during the post-award phase for the new F-5E/F or F/A-18A/B maintenance contract can 
be accomplished by carefully following the FAR mandated procedures of the source 
selection and award phase.27  
6. F-5E/F & F/A-18A/B Contract Issues 
Having discussed the various issues concerning contract termination, contract 
claims, and contract closeouts, there are two contract costs directly associated with all 
three alternative options of the CBA, contract closeout costs and contract solicitation 
costs.  Taking the no cost award option versus the costly termination for convenience 
alternative involves only contract closeout costs upon the end of performance of the 
current F-5E/F maintenance contract.  Also, all three alternative options of the CBA 
involve contract solicitation costs for either the F-5E/F or F/A-18A/B contract.  Both 
SOWs for the F-5E/F maintenance contract at VFC-13 and F/A-18A/B maintenance 
contract at NSAWC, NAS Fallon Nevada, are included in appendices C and D 
respectively.  Although both contract closeout costs and contract solicitation costs are 
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direct costs associated with this CBA, because they are included in all three alternatives, 
they can be classified as irrelevant costs.  Yet, irrelevant costs or not, these costs should 
still be considered when analyzing all costs of the three alternatives 
a. T4C vs. Contract Expiration 
For the F-5E/F maintenance contract currently performed in NAS Fallon, 
NV, a termination for convenience can take effect any given time by the government.  
The contracting officer at NAVAIR is required to provide at least thirty days notice to the 
contractor if the government elects to terminate for convenience.  Termination for 
Convenience is not normally in the Government’s best interest in a Firm Fixed Price 
environment.  When a contractor loses a significant amount of business for any reason, 
there will be claims.  For the F-5E/F Firm Fixed Price maintenance contract with award-
option incentives, it would be better to not award the next option or wait until the end of 
the contract life in order to forgo potentially costly claims, disputes, and appeals.  Hence, 
when faced with the decision to closeout a contract, NAVAIR’s preference is to wait 
until the option year is complete and not award the next option or wait until the end of the 
contract life.28.  By choosing this route, NAVAIR is faced with only contract closeout 
costs, thereby bypassing costly termination for convenience costs.  All three alternatives 
involve contract closeout costs, which will be incurred at the end of the current F-5E/F 
maintenance contract life.  Estimated contract closeout costs for the current F-5E/F 
maintenance contract, based on indirect salary costs, can be up to $1000.29. 
b. Contract Solicitation Issues 
Both contracts for F-5E/F and F/A-18A/B maintenance are currently 
performed in NAS Fallon, NV.  The Procurement Cycle Time (PCT) from requirements 
generation to contract award was approximately eight months.  Both the F-5E/F and F/A-
18A/B contract solicitations were administered at the same time.  The contract 
solicitation could have been shorter by a few months, however, the contracting officer 
was required to perform a formal source selection, which requires several formal steps as 
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outlined in previous sections.  For both contracts, there was a single SSA, a SSAC made 
up of eight senior management officials, and a SSEB comprised of the leads of three 
evaluation teams, Past Performance, Price, and Technical Experience.  The SSEB 
members compiled the evaluation from each team.  The teams themselves were made up 
of about three to five personnel for each team who worked full time during the 
evaluation, totaling about twenty personnel.  Both contract evaluations took about two 
weeks to perform, and NAVAIR’s indirect salary costs to administer the solicitation of 
each contract were approximately $500,000.  This contract solicitation cost is a one-time 
cost incurred after the end of performance of the current F-5E/F maintenance contract 
and equally affects all three alternatives.  Hence, as far as contract solicitation 
alternatives are concerned, choosing to solicit an F-5E/F or F/A-18A/B maintenance 
contract has minimal impact on cost alternatives.30 
C. TRAINING  
When looking at a training viewpoint, the F-18A/B has 4th generation pulse-
doppler radar capabilities, allowing the F/A-18A/B to simulate the higher threat aircraft 
such as the MiG-29, Su-27, and Su-30.  This 4th generation pulse-doppler radar capability 
of the F/A-18A/B provides a significant benefit in Navy pilot adversary training 
compared to the F-5E/F, and the 4th generation radar capability is an essential component 
of alternative 2 and 3 of this CBA.  The pulse-doppler radar emits an electronic signature, 
which makes the F/A-18A/B appear to be a MiG29, Su27, or other higher threat aircraft 
when conducting training missions.  Furthermore, the F/A-18A/B’s general performance 
capabilities enable it to simulate higher threat adversary aircraft.  Hence, the F/A-
18A/B’s ability to simulate higher threat aircraft such as the MiG 29, Su-27, and Su-30 
through its general performance characteristics is the benefit provided to the Navy. 
On the other hand, the F-5E/F, without modification, has only a pulse radar.  This 
pulse radar capability provides a benefit in Navy pilot adversary training.  Yet, the pulse 
radar of the F-5E/F merely allows the aircraft to simulate a lower threat aircraft, such as 
the MiG-21, as opposed to a higher threat aircraft.  The aggressor pilots are trained in 
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Soviet tactics and use the F-5 to simulate MiG-21s for training US Navy pilots in aerial 
combat skills.  Although there is a greater chance in encountering a MiG-21 than other 
higher threat aircraft as there are over 8,000 MiG-21’s produced worldwide flown by 
over 40 countries per appendix E, 31 it is in the squadron’s best interest to train to the 
higher threat aircraft.  The approximate cost to purchase and install a 4th generation pulse 
radar on the F-5E/F is $1.5 million per aircraft. 32 
D. SAFETY 
Aircraft hazard rate can provide a safety benefit by providing a difference in 
hazard rates between two aircraft.  The difference in aircraft hazard rates will benefit the 
aircraft with the lower hazard rate.   
Aviation safety data for both the F-5E/F and F/A-18A/B was retrieved from the 
Naval Safety Center Aviation Data and Analysis Division.  The Aviation Data and 
Analysis Divisions sole purpose is to manage and retrieves aviation-safety data.  The 
Aviation Data and Analysis Division collects and maintains this information in a database 
containing approximately 1,050 different characteristics stored in over 100 related 
database tables, with literally thousands of different encoded values.  The F-5E/F and 
F/A-18A/B aviation safety data collected spanned the period from October 1999 thru 
October 2003.  The aviation safety data was broken down to severe hazards where loss of 
life or serious hazard was likely and probable and routine hazards where minor injury 
was likely and probable.  The F-5 had 1 severe hazard and 2 routine hazards where as the 
F/A-18A/B had 18 severe hazards and 38 routine hazards.33 
Each class hazard can be divided by the number of aircraft in the US Naval 
inventory for which the hazard occurred in order to get a hazard per aircraft amount.  The 
hazard per aircraft amount divided by the number of years for which the data was 
collected will provide a hazard per aircraft per year ratio.  The difference in ratios for 
each aircraft will provide a safety benefit for the aircraft that provides the lesser amount 
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of hazards.  It is this safety factor for the F-5 aircraft, which provides the benefit for the 
F-5 alternative. 
With 32 F-5E/F’s and 201 F/A-18A/B’s currently in US Naval inventory, the 
severe hazard rate is .69% per year for the F-5E/F and 8.08% per year for the F/A-18A/B, 
and the routine hazard rate is 1.39% per year for the F-5E/F and 24% per year for the 
F/A-18A/B.  The F-5E/F has the lower hazard rate and will benefit with a 7.39% per year 
severe hazard benefit and a 22.61% per year routine hazard benefit over the F/A-18A/B.  
This means the F-5 has a 7.39% per year and 22.61% per year less likelier chance of 
experiencing a severe hazard and routine hazard, respectively, than the F/A-18A/B. 
E. T/M/S RETIREMENT 
The US Navy currently operates 68 different type/model/series (T/M/S) aircraft.34  
Several initiatives to reduce this number are occurring in naval aviation in order to reduce 
overall aircraft support costs.  For example, a number of aircraft have been selected for 
retirement, including the single seat F/A-18A and two seat F/A-18B models.  Hence, 
retirement of either the F-5E/F or F/A-18A/B is a benefit to the Navy by supporting its 
cost savings objectives. 
The F-5 Tiger II single seat model E and the two seat model F were built in 1971.  
The F-5E/F aircraft are modifications of the original F-5 Tiger designed by Northrop in 
1954.  The F-5E/F aircraft are slated to remain in service for another 12 years until 2015.  
To date, no replacement aircraft have been identified to replace the F-5s.   
The F/A-18A/B Hornet are scheduled for retirement.  By 2007, 65 F/A-18A and 5 
F/A-18B aircraft will be retired.35  The first F/A-18A/B models were delivered to the 
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 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
FA-18A 192 140 140 129 127 127 127 114 92 58 
FA-18B 33 33 33 28 28 28 28 23 23 23 
Table 4.  Projected F/A-18 Aircraft Retirement 
Hence, the retirement of the F/A-18A/B in 2007 will provide a benefit to the 
Navy by supporting the Navy’s efforts to reduce the number of T/M/S.  In fact, 
retirement of either the F/A-18A/B or the F-5E/F will be provide a benefit to the Navy.  
Yet, the retirement of the F-5E/F will provide a greater benefit to the Navy than the F/A-
18A/B as the Navy will be losing a T/M/S aircraft that is more dissimilar to other aircraft.  
This is beneficial because of the various support costs associated with the F-5E/F that 
will go away.  The F/A-18A/B’s retirement will not have the same beneficial impact on 
reduction of aircraft support costs as they are still supporting F/A-18C/D and E/F’s.  In 
the context of the alternatives analyzed in this CBA, choosing to retire the F-5E/F and 
replacing it with the F/A-18A/B, therefore, provides a greater benefit to the Navy than 
choosing to retain the F-5E/F T/M/S.  As T/M/S is a qualitative benefit and does not have 
any measurement indicators, it will not be addressed again until the recommendations 
section. 
F. READINESS 
Especially in war time, as recently experienced during the Iraq War, spare parts 
availability is lower for the F/A-18A/B than the F-5E/F due to prioritization of spare parts 
going to the F-18C/D’s and E/F’s.36  This readiness delta in the context of spare parts 
availability provides a benefit to the F-5 alternatives for this CBA.  Furthermore, with the 
Navy receiving 32 low-flight-time Swiss F-5E aircraft to replace the current higher-
flight-time aircraft, VFC-13 will be in a better readiness position than using the higher-
flight-time and higher-cost F/A-18A/B aircraft.37  As readiness is a qualitative benefit 
and does not have any measurement indicators, it will not be addressed again until the 
recommendations section.  
                                                 
36 Suggs, William LCDR. VFC-13, Operations Officer. Telephone interview with LCDR Rob 
DeGuzman. NPS, Monterey, California, November 14, 2003. 
37 Sirak, Michael. Iraq war delays edelivery of Swiss F-5Es to US Navy. Jane’s Defence Weekly, 












THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
43 
VI. PREDICT IMPACTS QUANTITATIVELY OVER LIFE OF 
PROJECT  
Step 4 of a CBA is to quantify impacts that can be reasonably quantified for each 
alternative over the life of the project.  The Flying Hour Program direct cost categories of 
Fuel, AVDLRs, Maintenance Consumables, and Contract Maintenance, as well as the 
Contract Administration Costs (Contract Closeout and Contract Solicitation Costs) and 
Training costs (F/A-18A/B 4th generation radar capabilities) are measured in dollars and 
their future impacts will be discussed monetarily in the monetized impacts section.  The 
benefits of safety are not measured in dollars; however, the calculation of safety benefits 
per year to monetized units will be presented in the monetized impact section as well.  
The qualitative benefits of training, T/M/S reduction, and readiness do not have any 
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VII. MONETIZED IMPACTS  
The fifth step of a CBA is to monetize each of the impacts identified in step 3. 38  
The impacts to be monetized include the direct flying hour program costs, contract 
administration costs, training costs, and safety benefits.   
A. FLYING HOUR PROGRAM COSTS 
The cost per flight hour is calculated from two types of data collected from a 
variety of sources.  These two categorie s are informational and budgetary.  The Type 
Commander (CNAR) provides the informational elements such as number of aircraft, 
utilization and mission requirements.  The budgetary elements as grouped by Aviation 
Fleet Maintenance (OFC-50) have direct impact on determining the cost per flying hour 
for each type of aircraft.  This CBA will focus on the following key budgetary cost 
elements:  Fuel (FF), Maintenance Consumables (FM), Contract Maintenance (FW), 
Aviation Depot Level Repairables (FA), and Contract Administration Costs.  In 
accordance with OFC-50, Maintenance and Contract costs have been grouped together as 
one category of direct costs titled Maintenance/Contract (FM/FW) costs.  Contract 
Administration Costs are composed of contract solicitation and contract closeout costs.  
The annual operational costs for both the F-5E/F and F/A-18A/B are listed in Table 5.  
These total costs for the F-5E/F and F/A-18A/B programs will be used to calculate a cost 
per flying hour. 
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Category FY02 Costs 
Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II  
AVDLR (FA) $   14,573,173
Fuel (FF) $     6,982,837
Maintenance/Contracts (FM/FW) $   23,802,925
Annual Cost $   45,358,935
Boeing F/A-18A/B Hornet  
AVDLR (FA) $   26,981,714
Fuel (FF) $   15,899,947
Maintenance/Contracts (FM/FW) $   26,450,009
Annual Cost  $   69,331,670 
Table 5.  FY02 Annual Operational Costs for F-5E/F & F/A-18A/B 
The VAMOSC system provides Operating and Support (O&S) costs for all 
aspects of Naval Aviation from high- level aggregate reports to detailed reports on 
individual systems during specific time periods.  This program was used to obtain actual 
annual costs incurred given the number of flight hours by both aircraft types during 
FY02.  A VAMOSC extract of the flying hour programs direct costs (FF, FA, FW/FM) 
are included in appendix B.  For the purpose of this CBA, Navy aircraft, flight hours and 
costs were used to make comparisons between platforms. 
The operational costs of the F-5E/F and F/A-18A/B in this CBA will be compared 
at the contract’s target flight hours since the NAVAIR contract with SSS Inc. is based 




Category FY02 Costs 
Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II  
AVDLR costs per FH    $  1,256  
Maintenance/Contract Costs per FH    $  2,052  
Fuel Costs per FH    $     602  
Total F-5E/F Cost/FH  $  3,910  
  
Boeing F/A-18A/B Hornet  
AVDLR costs per FH  $  2,326  
Maintenance/Contract Costs per FH  $  2,280  
Fuel Costs per FH  $  1,371  
Total F/A-18AB Cost/FH  $  5,977  
Table 6.  Comparison of Costs for 11,600 Flight Hours 
The three major costs for the F-5E/F and F/A-18A/B models: Fuel, AVDLR, and 
Maintenance/Contracts were entered into Excel.  Each cost was divided by the number of 
flight hours flown by each type of aircraft to determine a Fuel cost per flight hour, 
AVDLR Cost per flight hour, and Maintenance/Contract Cost per flight hour. 
A similar method of data analysis was conducted with the F/A-18A/B costs.  In 
FY02 the F/A18A/B aircraft 27,294 flight hours.  Once each cost per flight hour was 
determined each was multiplied by 11,600 flight hours in order to compare costs.  Figures 
1 and 2 display the cost elements as a percentage of the flying hours costs for the F-5E/F 
and F/A-18A/B.  The F-5E aircraft and F/A-18A aircraft fly the majority of the flight 
hours since the F-5F and F/A-18B are primarily used for training of instructor pilots vice 
aggressor training. 
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Figure 1.   F-5E/F Flying Hour Cost Elements 
 










Figure 2.   F/A-18A/B Flying Hour Cost Elements 
1. Fuel Costs 
JP-5 fuel is used by aircraft operating at sea, because it has a higher flashpoint and 
presents less danger of explosion in a shipboard environment than JP-8.  However for 
aircraft operating from shore facilities JP-8 is used because its chemical composition is 
almost identical to JP-5 and burns cleaner.  Fuel usage for the Department of the Navy is 
charged at a price established by the Defense Energy Supply Center.  The Navy 
Petroleum Office promulgates the expend iture price for all Navy and Marine Corps 
activities to report fuel usage each fiscal year.  JP-8 jet fuel prices were obtained from the 
Navy Petroleum Office’s Bulk Petroleum Annual Price Lists for FY01-FY04.  The actual 
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costs incurred for fuel by both aircraft types were extracted from the VAMOSC system 
and divided by the number of flight hours flown to determine a fuel cost per flight hour.  
Historical data was also used to determine the range of fuel costs for later use in the 
Crystal Ball simulation.  The range for fuel was +/- 22%. 
2. Aviation Depot Level Repairables Costs 
AVDLR costs were obtained from VAMOSC reports for each type of aircraft.  
AVDLR costs for the CBA include: AVDLR cost of goods, AVDLR cost recovery, 
Commercial Aircraft Rework and Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework.  These costs 
were divided by the number of flight hours to estimate an AVDLR cost per flight hour.  
The range for AVDLR price changes was estimated to by +/- 5%. 
3. Maintenance/Contract Costs  
Maintenance consumables and contract maintenance costs were also obtained 
from VAMOSC.  In accordance with OFC-50, Maintenance and Contract costs have been 
grouped together as one category of direct costs titled Maintenance/Contract (FM/FW) 
costs.  Maintenance consumables costs include the costs of the maintenance consumable 
repair part.  Contract maintenance includes contractor logistics support, intermediate 
level civilian, and contractor support..  The sum of these costs were divided by the 
number of flight hours flown to estimate the Maintenance/Contract cost per flight hour.  
The range for Maintenance/Contract costs was estimated to be +/- 7%. 
B. CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION COSTS 
Having discussed the various issues concerning contract termination, contract 
claims, and contract closeouts, there are two contract costs directly associated with all 
three alternatives of the CBA; contract closeout costs and contract solicitation costs.  
Taking the no cost award option versus the costly termination for convenience alternative 
involves only contract closeout costs upon the end of performance of the current F-5E/F 
maintenance contract.  Estimated contract closeout costs for the current F-5E/F 
maintenance contract, based on indirect salary costs, can be up to $1,00039.  All three 
alternatives in this CBA involve contract solicitation costs for either the F-5E/F or F/A-
18A/B maintenance contract.  NAVAIR’s indirect salary costs to administer the 
                                                 
39 Contract Closeout Case Study.  MN4371: Principles of Acquisition  & Contracting Policy. NPS, 
Monterey, California, 16 October 2003. 
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solicitation of either contract will be approximately $500,000.40  Contract closeout costs 
and contract solicitation costs are direct costs associated with this CBA, and will occur in 
2008 regardless of the alternative selected and are classified irrelevant costs.  These costs 
are not relevant in calculating the cost per flying hour, they will be considered when 
analyzing all benefits and costs of the three alternatives analyzed in order to provide a 
complete assessment of benefits and costs.  
C. TRAINING COSTS 
The 4th generation pulse-doppler radar capabilities of the F/A-18A/B enables the 
F/A-18A/B to simulate higher threat aircraft, such as the MiG-29, Su-27 and Su-30, for 
aggressor training purposes.  It is this unique training capability of the F/A-18A/B that 
provides a benefit over the F-5E/F aircraft.  The  cost to install a 4th generation pulse-
doppler radar in the F-5E/F aircraft is $1.5 million per aircraft. 41  As there are currently 
23 aircraft in VFC-13, the total installation cost is $34.5 million for the F-5E/F pulse-
doppler radar alternative.  The $34.5 million installation cost will be an additiona l cost 
that must be added to the F-5 total program cost in alternative 3 before computing net 
present value. 
D. SAFETY BENEFITS 
The aviation safety data collected from the Naval Safety Center was broken down 
to severe hazards, where loss of life or serious hazard was likely, and probable and 
routine hazards, where minor injury was likely and probable.  The F-5 has a 7.39% per 
year and a 22.61% per year less chance of experiencing a severe hazard and routine 
hazard, respectively, than the F/A-18.  Safety benefits for both severe and routine hazards 
will be monetized by applying each safety benefit against the amount of lost productivity 
time resulting from an average mishap.  Damage to aircraft as a result of the hazard and 
the resulting repair costs will not be used as these costs are captured in the direct costs of 
the flying hour program (AVDLRs, Maintenance Consumables, and Contract 
Maintenance).  Lost productivity will be prorated using the wage rates for a Navy E-4 
                                                 
40 Bolles, Jay. C. NAVAIR PMA225V2.  Telephone interview with LT Jesse Porter, NPS, Monterey, 
California, 27 October 2003. 
41 Suggs, William LCDR. VFC-13, Operations Officer. Telephone interview with LCDR Rob 
DeGuzman. NPS, Monterey, California, November 14, 2003. 
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with six years ($36,305/yr)42 since E-4’s perform a majority of the maintenance work 
where severe and routine hazards usually occur.  The average number of lost productivity 
days for a severe hazard is 14 days and a routine hazard is 1 day. 43  Given a 360-day 
calendar year, lost productivity for an E-4 with six years is $1,411.86 for a severe hazard 
and $100.85 for a routine hazard.  Applying the F-5 safety benefits of 7.39% and 22.61% 
per year provides a monetized dollar figure of $104.34 per year for severe hazards and 
$22.80 per year for routine hazards, providing a total dollar figure of $127.14 per year. 
                                                 
42Fiscal year 2003 Military Pay and Allowances.  FY2003 Average Annual Salary Charts. December 
3, 2003. http://usmilitary.about.com/library/milinfo/pay/blenlistedsalary.htm 
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VIII. DISCOUNTING BENEFITS/COSTS TO OBTAIN PRESENT 
VALUES 
Step 6 of a CBA requires the analyst to discount all benefits and costs to obtain 
present values of the three alternatives analyzed.44  In accordance with Office of Budget 
and Management Circular on Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of 
Federal Programs (OMB A-94.), a discount rate of 7% will be used to account for the 
time value of money.  Since the OMB A-94 circular states future inflation is highly 
uncertain and analysts should avoid making assumptions about inflation whenever 
possible, no provision is made in this study to account for inflation.  All computations 
were completed using Microsoft Office Excel.  When calculating NPV, 12 years was 
analyzed for this CBA (FY2003-2014) due to the remaining projected 12-year service life 
of the F-5E/F.  The safety benefits for operating an F-5E/F in each alternative are 
displayed in Table 7. 





2003  $             127  $                127   $             127  
2004  $             127  $                127   $             127  
2005  $             127  $                127   $             127  
2006  $             127  $                127   $             127  
2007  $             127  $                127   $             127  
2008  $             127  $                127   $             127  
2009  $             127  -  $             127  
2010  $             127  -  $             127  
2011  $             127  -  $             127  
2012  $             127  -  $             127  
2013  $             127  -  $             127  
2014  $             127  -  $             127  
CUM. TOTAL 
 $          1,526  $                 763  $           1,526 
NPV $           1,010$                  430  $           1,010 
Table 7.  Discounted benefit of F-5 radar operation 
                                                 
44 Boardman, Anthony, et al. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice, Second Edition. New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001. 
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The costs associated with each alternative are fuel, AVDLR,  
contract/maintenance, contract administration and training.  Since contract administration 
costs occur in the last year of a contract, these costs are reflected in 2008.  Although 
pilots welcome the opportunity to train against a higher threat adversary, there is not a 
clear method to attach a dollar value to the training opportunity.  However this CBA does 
account for the installation cost to provide this training in alternative three. 
The costs of continuing to operate the F-5 aircraft to simulate 3rd generation 









Training Yearly Total 
2003  $    (14,573,173)  $   (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837)  $                    -     $                -     $   (45,358,935) 
2004  $    (14,573,173)  $   (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837)  $                    -     $                -     $   (45,358,935) 
2005  $    (14,573,173)  $   (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837)  $                    -     $                -     $   (45,358,935) 
2006  $    (14,573,173)  $   (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837)  $                    -     $                -     $   (45,358,935) 
2007  $    (14,573,173)  $   (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837)  $                    -     $                -     $   (45,358,935) 
2008  $    (14,573,173)  $   (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837)  $        (501,000)  $                -     $   (45,859,935) 
2009  $    (14,573,173)  $   (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837)  $                    -     $                -     $   (45,358,935) 
2010  $    (14,573,173)  $   (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837)  $                    -     $                -     $   (45,358,935) 
2011  $    (14,573,173)  $   (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837)  $                    -     $                -     $   (45,358,935) 
2012  $    (14,573,173)  $   (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837)  $                    -     $                -     $   (45,358,935) 
2013  $    (14,573,173)  $   (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837)  $                    -     $                -     $   (45,358,935) 
2014  $    (14,573,173)  $   (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837)  $                    -     $                -     $   (45,358,935) 
CUM 
TOTAL  $  (174,878,076)  $ (285,635,100)  $ (83,794,044)  $        (501,000)  $                -     $ (544,808,220) 
Net Present Value @ 7% =   $  (360,605,629)     
 Table 8.  NPV Alternative One 
The costs associated with alternative two are displayed in Table 9.  It reflects the 
costs that would be incurred by continuing to operate the F-5E/F until 2008 and then 











Training Yearly Total 
2003  $   (14,573,173)  $     (23,802,925)  $      (6,982,837)  $                    -     $             -     $    (45,358,935) 
2004  $   (14,573,173)  $     (23,802,925)  $      (6,982,837)  $                    -     $             -     $    (45,358,935) 
2005  $   (14,573,173)  $     (23,802,925)  $      (6,982,837)  $                    -     $             -     $    (45,358,935) 
2006  $   (14,573,173)  $     (23,802,925)  $      (6,982,837)  $                    -     $             -     $    (45,358,935) 
2007  $   (14,573,173)  $     (23,802,925)  $      (6,982,837)  $                    -     $             -     $    (45,358,935) 
2008  $   (26,981,714)  $     (26,450,009)  $    (15,899,947)  $         (501,000)  $             -     $    (69,832,670) 
2009  $   (26,981,714)  $     (26,450,009)  $    (15,899,947)  $                    -     $             -     $    (69,331,670) 
2010  $   (26,981,714)  $     (26,450,009)  $    (15,899,947)  $                    -     $             -     $    (69,331,670) 
2011  $   (26,981,714)  $     (26,450,009)  $    (15,899,947)  $                    -     $             -     $    (69,331,670) 
2012  $   (26,981,714)  $     (26,450,009)  $    (15,899,947)  $                    -     $             -     $    (69,331,670) 
2013  $   (26,981,714)  $     (26,450,009)  $    (15,899,947)  $                    -     $             -     $    (69,331,670) 
2014  $   (26,981,714)  $     (26,450,009)  $    (15,899,947)  $                    -     $             -     $    (69,331,670) 
CUM 
TOTAL 
 $ (261,737,863)  $   (304,164,688)  $  (146,213,814)  $         (501,000)  $             -     $  (712,617,365) 
Net Present Value @ 7% =  $   (452,720,596)     
 Table 9.  NPV Alternative Two 
Alternative three involves modification of the existing F-5E/F aircraft by 
installing a pulse doppler radar system.  This one time cost is reflected in the training cost 
for 2008.  The detailed costs for alternative three are listed in Table 10. 




Training Yearly Total 
2003  $    (14,573,173)  $           (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837) 0  $                  -     $    (45,358,935) 
2004  $    (14,573,173)  $           (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837) 0  $                  -     $    (45,358,935) 
2005  $    (14,573,173)  $           (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837) 0  $                  -     $    (45,358,935) 
2006  $    (14,573,173)  $           (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837) 0  $                  -     $    (45,358,935) 
2007  $    (14,573,173)  $           (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837) 0  $                  -     $    (45,358,935) 
2008  $    (14,573,173)  $           (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837)  $         (501,000)  $ (34,500,000)  $    (80,359,935) 
2009  $    (14,573,173)  $           (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837) 0  $                  -     $    (45,358,935) 
2010  $    (14,573,173)  $           (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837) 0  $                  -     $    (45,358,935) 
2011  $    (14,573,173)  $           (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837) 0  $                  -     $    (45,358,935) 
2012  $    (14,573,173)  $           (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837) 0  $                  -     $    (45,358,935) 
2013  $    (14,573,173)  $           (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837) 0  $                  -     $    (45,358,935) 
2014  $    (14,573,173)  $           (23,802,925)  $   (6,982,837) 0  $                  -     $    (45,358,935) 
CUM 
TOTAL  $  (174,878,076)  $         (285,635,100)  $ (83,794,044)  $         (501,000)  $ (34,500,000)  $  (579,308,220) 
Net Present Value @ 7% =    $         (383,594,436)     
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IX. COMPUTE THE NET PRESENT VALUE (NPV) OF EACH 
ALTERNATIVE 
Step 7 of a CBA requires the analyst to compute the NPV of each alternative 
analyzed.45  NPV is computed by taking the difference between the PV of benefits 
[PV(B)] and the PV of costs [PV(C)]. In this CBA, this equation is key to 
recommendations and conclusions. According to Boardman, if there are multiple 
mutually exclusive alternatives, pick the one with the highest NPV.  A summary of the 
NPV of each alternative is included in Table 11. 
 BENEFITS [PV(B)] COSTS[PV (C)] NPV 
Alternative one   $                     1,010   $   (360,605,629)  $ (360,604,619) 
Alternative two  $                        430   $   (452,720,596)  $ (452,720,166) 
Alternative three  $                     1,010   $   (383,594,436)  $ (383,593,426) 
Table 11.  Summary of NPV for each alternative 
                                                 
45 Boardman, Anthony, et al. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice, Second Edition. New 
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X. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Step 8 of a CBA is to perform a sensitivity analysis of the alternatives analyzed.  
A sensitivity analysis is warranted as there may be considerable uncertainty about both 
the predicted impacts and the appropriate monetary valuation of each unit of the 
impact.46  Crystal Ball is a simulation and modeling software application by 
Decisioneering Inc.  This program was used to create a model of the operational cost of 
the F-5E/F and F/A-18A/B aircraft.  The model was constructed to estimate the effects of 
changes of four key variables flight hours, fuel cost, AVDLR costs and 
contract/maintenance costs on the operational costs of the F-5 and F/A-18 aircraft.  This 
section will address the impact of changes in critical elements and their effect on the 
overall cost of each alternative.  Separate simulation runs of 10,000 trials were made for 
the F-5E/F and F/A-18A/B at 11,600 flight hours. 
In order to utilize Crystal Ball for this CBA, a distribution had to be selected for 
each of the four variables tested.  A triangle distribution was used for flight hours because 
the NAVAIR contract with SSS Inc. established a target number of 11,600 flight hours.  
In addition, the contract set a minimum number of 1,000 and a maximum of 11,820 flight 
hours.  Since the actual number of flight hours flown in FY02 exceed the maximum 
number of flight hours in the contract, 14,000 was used in this simulation.  Since the 
probability of the actual costs falling anywhere within the established ranges for 
Maintenance, AVDLR and Contract Maintenance was equally likely to occur a uniform 
distribution was used.  Table 12 contains the ranges based upon historical data, as 
explained in the Computing Costs section of this CBA. 
Symbol Cost Elements Range 
FF Fuel +/- 22% 
FA AVDLR +/-  5% 
FM/FW Maintenance/Contracts +/-  7% 
Table 12.  Ranges for each Crystal Ball variable 
                                                 
46 Boardman, Anthony, et al. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice, Second Edition. New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001. 
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The histogram in Figure 3 was produced by Crystal Ball.  As a result of the 
10,000 trials conducted the cost per flight hour for the F-5E/F was approximately 
$3,886.33.  This cost will be used by Crystal Ball to conduct sensitivity analysis, compare 














$3,578.29 $3,732.31 $3,886.33 $4,040.35 $4,194.37
10,000 Trials    9,991 Displayed
Forecast: F-5 Cost/FH
 
Figure 3.   Estimated F-5E/F Cost per Flight Hour 
 
The histogram in Figure 4 was also produced by Crystal Ball.  As a result of the 
10,000 trials conducted the cost per flight hour for the F/A-18A/B was approximately 
$5,976.58.  This cost will be used by Crystal Ball to conduct sensitivity analysis, compare 
















$5,432.19 $5,704.38 $5,976.58 $6,248.77 $6,520.97
10,000 Trials    9,995 Displayed
Forecast: F/A-18 Cost/FH
 
Figure 4.   Estimated F/A-18A/B Cost per Flight Hour 
The sensitivity analysis was performed using Crystal Ball’s Tornado Chart tool.  
This tool enables the user to analyze the variables used in the model.  A tornado chart is 
used to produce prioritized sensitivity analysis by testing the range of each variable: Fuel 
Cost, Contract/Maintenance Cost, AVDLR Cost at specified percentiles and calculating 
the cost per flight hour.  A tornado chart measures the effect of each variable on the Cost 
per flight hour independently while freezing the other variables at the base values to 
remove their effect on the flight hour cost.  It defines an upper and lower limit for each 
variable.  As long as a variable remains within this range the assumptions and the model 
are valid.  This tool replaces the manual method of performing a calculation, recording 
the results and repeating the process. 
Two separate tornado charts were produced by Crystal Ball, one for each type of 
aircraft.  In Figure 5 the most sensitive variable is the F-5 Maintenance Cost per Flight 
Hour.  This cost was estimated by Crystal Ball to be $3,886.33/FH.  The centerline of the 
tornado chart is centered on this value.  The tornado chart arranges the variables in a 
funnel shape. The variable with the largest effect on the cost is contract maintenance and 
it appears at the top of the chart.  The upper limit (upside) and lower limit (downside) of 
each variable is displayed for each variable.  In a worst case the total cost per flight hour 
could increase by $270.11 to $4,155.37/FH.  Conversely the cost per flight hour could 
decrease by the same amount to $3,615.15/FH.  This change in flight hour cost would 
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increase the annual cost to operate the F-5E/F to $48,202,292 or decrease the cost to 
$41,935,740. 
F-5 Cost/FH


















Figure 5.   F-5 Tornado Chart 
The Tornado chart for the F/A-18 is included in Figure 6.  The Crystal Ball model 
estimated the F/A-18’s cost per flight hour at $5,976.58/FH.  The most sensitive variable 
in this model is the F/A-18’s Fuel Cost per Flight Hour.  The flying hour cost for the F/A-
18 could increase by $461.97 to $6,438.84/FH or decrease by the same amount to 
$5,514.90/FH.  This change in flight hour cost would increase the annual cost to operate 
the F/A-18A/B to $$74,690,530 or decrease the cost to $63,972,810. 
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F/A-18 Cost/FH

















Figure 6.   F/A-18 Tornado Chart 
As a result of the sensitivity analysis, Table 13 was created to assist in the 
comparison of effects of the flying hour costs for both aircraft from 2008 to 2014.  When 
a comparison is made between the F/A-18A/B at its best case (lowest) flying hour cost 
and the F-5E/F at its worst case (highest) flying hour cost, the difference over the life of 






  Worst Case Best Case 
2008* $48,703,292 $64,473,810 
2009 $48,202,292 $63,972,810 
2010 $48,202,292 $63,972,810 
2011 $48,202,292 $63,972,810 
2012 $48,202,292 $63,972,810 
2013 $48,202,292 $63,972,810 
2014 $48,202,292 $63,972,810 
Cum. Total 
$337,917,044 $448,310,670 
NPV @ 7% $260,244,326  $345,236,211 
Difference $84,991,886  
 *Includes 501,000 in Contract Costs in 2008  
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XI. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Step 9 of a CBA requires the analyst to make a recommendation based on the 
NPV and sensitivity analysis.  Boardman, recommends that the analyst adopt the project 
with the largest NPV.47  This CBA analyzes the NPV of quantifiable impacts of direct 
flying hour program costs, contract administration costs, and safety benefits.  Using 
Boardman’s NPV method, alternative one had a NPV of ($360) million, which was the 
greatest of the three alternatives analyzed.  The NPV of Alternative two was ($453) 
million while alternative three was ($384) million.  There were other qualitative impacts 
analyzed within the CBA.  These qualitative items were training, T/M/S reduction, and 
readiness.  Although alternative one had the highest NPV, factoring in these qualitative 
benefits could influence the decision maker to choose one of the other more expensive 
alternatives.  For example, given that alternative one is $93 million less than alternative 
two, the decision maker could be influenced to select alternative two if the qualitative 
benefits favors this option.  
1. Alternative One – Continue the status quo with operation of the F-5 
E/F. 
Alternative one involves continuing the status quo and operating the F-5E/F to 
simulate 3rd generation combat aircraft.  The Office of the Chief of Naval Aviation, 
Director Air Warfare (N78) has determined the F-5E/F will remain in service until at 
least 2014.  This alternative had the highest NPV and is the best alternative based upon 
the quantitative results of this CBA.  . 
· The F-5E/F possesses the lowest cost per flight hour. 
The cost per flight hour for the F-5E/F is $2,067 less than the F/A-18A/B.  The 
cost for the F/A-18A/B to perform the aggressor squadron mission from 2008-2014 
                                                 
47 Boardman, Anthony, et al. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice, Second Edition. New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001. 
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would be $84,991,886 (discounted at 7%.)  This figure is calculated by comparing the 
F/A-18’s best case (lowest) operational cost to the F-5’s worst case (highest) cost. 
· F-5E/F provides 3rd generation adversary training capabilities. 
The F-5E/F possesses a 3rd generation pulse radar which allows the aircraft to 
simulate lower threat aircraft such as the MiG-21, as opposed to higher threat aircraft, 
such as the MiG-29, Su-27, and Su-30.  Although MiG-21’s are a lower threat aircraft, 
there are more MiG 21’s in operation worldwide than 4th generation adversaries.  There 
are over 8,000 MiG-21’s in existence flown by approximately 40 countries per appendix 
E.48  This means that there is a greater chance of encountering a MiG-21 than any other 
threat aircraft.  The F-5E/F therefore performs a beneficial adversary role. 
· F-5E/F possesses a readiness benefit due to greater spare parts availability. 
As recently experienced during the Iraqi War, spare parts availability is lower for 
the F/A-18A/B than the F-5E/F.  This is due to spare parts priority for the F-18C/D’s and 
E/F’s.49  This readiness delta in the context of spare parts availability provides a benefit 
to the F-5E/F for this CBA.  Furthermore, the Department of the Navy purchased 32 
additional F-5E/F aircraft from Switzerland.  Each of these aircraft had less than 2000 
flight hours as of 2003.  Currently, these aircraft are being refurbished by Northrop 
Grumman and are slated to replace the current F-5’s, which have in excess of 6000 flight 
hours.  The deactivated F-5s will be used for spare parts. 
· The F-5E/F provides a safety benefit due to its lower aircraft hazard rates. 
Aircraft hazard rates can provide a safety benefit.  The difference in aircraft 
hazard rates is a benefit for the aircraft with the lower hazard rate.  Which aircraft that 
possesses the benefit can be determined by comparing the difference in hazard rates 
between the aircraft.  Aviation safety data for both the F-5E/F and F/A-18A/B was 
retrieved from the Naval Safety Center Aviation Data and Analysis Division.  There is a 
                                                 
48 Global Aircraft.  Accessed December 4, 2003. www.globalaircraft.org. 
49 Suggs, William LCDR. VFC-13, Operations Officer. Telephone interview with LCDR Rob 
DeGuzman. NPS, Monterey, California, November 14, 2003. 
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7.39% less chance of a severe hazard and a 22.61% less chance of a routine hazard with 
the F-5E/F than with the F/A-18A/B. 
· Adequate competition exists to compete maintenance contracts. 
Adequate competition exists for maintenance of F/A-18A/B aircraft.  This fact 
permits NAVAIR to use fixed price contracts for contractor-supported maintenance. 
2. Alternative Two – Replace the F-5E/F with the F/A-18A/B in 2008. 
Alternative two involves replacing the F-5E/F with the F/A-18A/B in 2008.  This 
alternative had the worst NPV of the three alternatives analyzed and the highest cost 
($452,720,166) over the life of the program.  However, this  alternative has the most 
unquantifiable benefits, which could potentially alter a decision maker to choose this 
alternative if the perceived value of the unquantifiable benefits exceeds the $93 million 
difference between this alternative and alternative one. 
· F/A-18A/B provides true 4th generation adversary training capabilities. 
This alternative provides true 4th generation adversary training without the need 
for modifications.  The F/A-18A/B is equipped with a Pulse-Doppler radar system that 
enables it to simulate high threat aircraft, such as MiG-29, Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft.  
Fourth generation radar technology provides a significant benefit in Navy pilot adversary 
training as compared to the F-5E/F.  The size, performance and operational envelope of 
the F/A-18A/B is comparable to and better able to simulate high threat aircraft, than the 
F-5E/F.  The F-5E/F has 3rd generation pulse radar that allows it to simulate low threat 
aircraft, such as the MiG-21.  Although there is a greater chance in encountering a MiG-
21, it is in the squadron’s best interest to train to the higher threat aircraft.  Hence, the 
F/A-18A/B performs a beneficial adversary role due to its ability to simulate 4th 
generation adversary aircraft. 
· Retiring the F-5E/F contributes to the Navy’s T/M/S reduction goal. 
Retiring the F-5 contributes to the Chief of Naval Aviation’s goal of reducing the 
number of T/M/S aircraft in the naval inventory.  This ultimately reduces overall aircraft 
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support costs for the active duty inventory and makes funds available for modernization 
and maintenance upkeep of other naval T/M/S aircraft. 
· F/A-18A/B possesses infrastructure cost efficiencies over F-5E/F. 
This option takes advantage of the existing maintenance and support 
infrastructure for the F/A-18A/B aircraft.  The F/A-18A/B’s retirement will not have the 
same beneficial impact on reducing aircraft support costs as that of the F-5E/F’s 
retirement because the navy infrastructure is still supporting F/A-18C/D and E/F’s. 
· Adequate competition exists to compete maintenance contracts. 
Adequate competition exists for maintenance of F/A-18A/B aircraft.  This fact 
permits NAVAIR to use fixed price contracts for contractor-supported maintenance. 
3. Alternative Three – Install pulse doppler radar capabilities on the 
existing F-5E/F aircraft by 2008, providing 4th generation aircraft 
simulation characteristics. 
Alternative three has the same benefits as alternative one with the addition of 
installing 4th generation pulse radar capabilities.  Alternative three involves ins talling 
Pulse-Doppler radar systems on the existing F-5E/F aircraft.  This alternative had the 
second highest NPV.  The cost over the life of the program would be $383,594,436.   
· F-5E/F permits 4th generation adversary training capabilities. 
Operation of the F-5E/F after pulse-doppler radar modification permits simulation 
of 4th generation aircraft, enabling the F-5E/F to simulate adversary threat of the MiG-21, 
MiG-29, Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Cost – NAVAIR should continue to use the F-5E/F Tiger II aircraft 
for the VFC-13 adversary-training mission through 2014. 
If cost savings is the major focus for the decision maker and T/M/S reduction and 
4th generation threat simulation training capabilities are of little value, then the 
recommended solution is alternative one.  Alternative one has the highest NPV of -$360 
million for the three alternatives analyzed. 
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2. Best Value-NAVAIR should assess the 4th generation fighter aircraft 
benefits of the F/A-18A/B to determine if they exceed the difference in 
costs between the F-5E/F and F/A-18A/B. 
If obtaining the best value is the goal of the decision maker, then the decision 
maker must decide how much value to place on each of the qualitative benefits and 
reassess the alternatives analyzed.  Given that the cost of alternative one is $93 million 
less than alternative two, the decision maker could select the more costly alternative if the 
qualitative benefits exceed $93 million. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW ON STUDY 
This study, which analyzes the choice between the F-5E/F and F/A-18A/B to 
perform the Navy’s adversary training mission for VFC-13 in Fallon, NV, has generated 
a number of related issues that were not addresses in this MBA project.  The following 
issues may serve as possible topics for further study: 
· Conduct cost/benefit analysis study of contractor supported maintenance 
compared to maintenance performed by military personnel. 
· Conduct cost/benefit analysis of contractor supported maintenance 
compared to maintenance performed by Navy reserve personnel. 
· Effect of retirement of F/A-18A/B aircraft on the spare parts availability in 
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APPENDIX A.  AGGRESSOR SQUADRON HISTORY TIMELINE 
1959  Original F-5 Tiger Designed by Northrop 
1968  Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT) program established by USN  
 
1969   1st DACT Class Convened (Early TOPGUN) 
 
1970  VF-126 receives 4 A-4’s for DACT missions 
 
1971  F-5 Tiger II’s Built 
1972  TOPGUN becomes full fledge independent program 
  VF-43 “Challengers” Established – Oceana 
  VF-126 “Bandits” Established - Miramar 
 
1975  TOPGUN gets 10 F-5E , 3 F-5F from USAF 
  VA-45 (Cecil Field) provides training for A-7 pilots 
  VA-127(Lemoore) provides training for A-7 pilots 
 
1980  VA-45 relocates to Key West, uses A-4 & T-39D for Adversary training 
 
1981  VF-127 becomes dedicated adversary squadron, obtains 3 F-5E’s 
 
1983  F/A-18 A/B’s Delivered to the Fleet 
 
1984  VA-45 Blackbirds (Key West) becomes full- fledge Aggressor squadron 
 
1985  VA-45 becomes VF-45 (Feb) 
VF-43 replaces F-5’s w/ Israeli F-21A Kfirs 
  
1987  VF-45 Brings back F-5 
  VA-127 becomes VFA-127 (Mar) ,relocates to Fallon (Oct) 
  TOPGUN exchanges F-5’s for F-16N 
 
1988  VFA-127 obtains 8 F-5E’s 
  VF-45 acquires 6 F-16N 
 
1989  VF-43 switches back to F-5’s (F-21A returned to Israel) 
 
1993  VF-43 Deactivated (Sept) 
  F/A-18 Reserve Squadron VFC-12 assumes VF-43 Duties  
  VFA-126 Decommissioned 
 
1994  VF-45 retires F-16N due to fatigue 
  VFC-12 transitions to FA-18 Hornet 
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1995  VF-45 gets 7 F-5E’s and 2 F-5F to fill void left by F-16N 
  Due to budget cuts, all F-16N’s were deactivated 
 
1996 VF-45 deactivated, F/A-18’s moved to VFC-12 (Oceana), F-5’s moved to 
VFC-13 (Fallon), VFC-13 transitions from 12 F/A-18 to 25 F-5’s 
 VFA-127 scheduled for deactivation 
Strike U, TOPGUN, TOPDOME programs consolidated and moved to 
NAS Fallon 
 
2007  65 F/A-18A, 5 F/A-18B scheduled for retirement 
 






















APPENDIX B.  VAMOSC EXTRACT OF FLYING HOUR 
PROGRAM COSTS 
 
F/A – 18A 2000 
  Then Year Dollars 
Constant FY02 
Dollars Count 
1.2.4.1.1.1 AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy 46,132,385 48,504,243  
1.2.4.1.1.2 AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines 32,578,198 34,253,179  
1.2.4.1.2.1 AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy  5,812,681 6,111,535  
1.2.4.1.2.2 AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines 4,104,853 4,315,901  
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs    
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs    
4.1.2.4.1.1.1 FRS AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy 2,030,956 2,135,376  
4.1.2.4.1.1.2 FRS AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines 3,277,100 3,445,589  
4.1.2.4.1.2.1 FRS AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy 255,900 269,057  
4.1.2.4.1.2.2 FRS AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines 412,915 434,145  
1.2.5.1 Fuel Costs- Navy 17,338,052 27,758,649  
1.2.5.2 Fuel Costs- Marines 11,888,819 19,034,293  
4.1.2.5.1 FRS Fuel Costs- Navy 491,772 787,339  
4.1.2.5.2 FRS Fuel Costs - Marines 996,908 1,596,074  
      
      
2.1.2 Intermediate Civilian Personnel Costs 109,000 118,285  
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs 89,000 90,622  
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Navy 8,511,519 8,666,652  
7.1.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Marines    
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Navy 83,571 85,094  
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines    
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines     
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   98 
A1.1.2 Regular Aircraft Number- Marines   77 
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   3 
A1.2.2 FRS Aircraft Number- Marines   5 
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   23,157 
A2.1.2 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Marines   19,148 
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy   665 
A2.2.2 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Marines   1,241 
Total Then Year $    134,113,629      
Total Constant Year    $ 157,606,033    
Total Number of Aircraft 183    
Total Flying Hours 44,211    
Cost Per Aircraft 732,861 861,235  
Cost Per Flying Hour 3,033         3,564.86    
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1.2.4.1.1.1 AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy 42,472,582 43,557,154  
1.2.4.1.1.2 AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines 30,767,109 31,552,773  
1.2.4.1.2.1 AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy  9,726,221 9,974,589  
1.2.4.1.2.2 AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines 7,045,668 7,225,585  
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs     
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs     
4.1.2.4.1.1.1 FRS AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy 1,559,760 1,599,590   
4.1.2.4.1.1.2 FRS AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines 3,505,055 3,594,560   
4.1.2.4.1.2.1 FRS AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy 357,185 366,306   
4.1.2.4.1.2.2 FRS AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines 802,657 823,154   
1.2.5.1 Fuel Costs- Navy 25,337,056 24,942,958  
1.2.5.2 Fuel Costs- Marines 20,909,055 20,583,830  
4.1.2.5.1 FRS Fuel Costs- Navy 911,929 897,745   
4.1.2.5.2 FRS Fuel Costs - Marines 1,601,882 1,576,966   
       
       
2.1.2 Intermediate Civilian Personnel Costs 1,284,108 1,340,405  
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs 3,677 3,691  
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Navy 11,019,022 11,059,944  
7.1.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Marines 10,391 10,430  
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Navy 178,997 179,662  
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines     
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines      
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy    96 
A1.1.2 Regular Aircraft Number- Marines    76 
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy    4 
A1.2.2 FRS Aircraft Number- Marines    5 
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy    23,783 
A2.1.2 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Marines    19,483 
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy    869 
A2.2.2 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Marines    1,280 
Total Then Year $ 157,492,354      
Total Constant Year    $  159,289,342    
Total Number of Aircraft 181    
Total Flying Hours 45,415    
Cost Per Aircraft 870,124 880,052   











1.2.4.1.1.1 AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy 49,203,263 49,060,986  
1.2.4.1.1.2 AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines 35,361,622 35,259,370  
1.2.4.1.2.1 AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy  6,248,815 6,230,746  
1.2.4.1.2.2 AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines 4,490,926 4,477,940  
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs    
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs    
4.1.2.4.1.1.1 FRS AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy 2,355,028 2,348,218  
4.1.2.4.1.1.2 FRS AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines 3,255,815 3,246,400  
4.1.2.4.1.2.1 FRS AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy 299,089 298,224  
4.1.2.4.1.2.2 FRS AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines 413,488 412,292  
1.2.5.1 Fuel Costs- Navy 27,328,944 27,328,944  
1.2.5.2 Fuel Costs- Marines 20,740,489 20,740,489  
4.1.2.5.1 FRS Fuel Costs- Navy 356,614 356,614  
4.1.2.5.2 FRS Fuel Costs - Marines 1,851,212 1,851,212  
     
     
2.1.2 Intermediate Civilian Personnel Costs 1,519,569 1,519,569  
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs 173,432 172,586  
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Navy 13,466,660 13,400,995  
7.1.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Marines    
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Navy 25,307 25,184  
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines    
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines    
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   94
A1.1.2 Regular Aircraft Number- Marines   77
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   1
A1.2.2 FRS Aircraft Number- Marines   3
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   23,709
A2.1.2 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Marines   19,669
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy   272
A2.2.2 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Marines   1,011
Total Then Year  $167,090,273   
Total Constant Year   $  166,729,769  
Total Number of Aircraft 175   
Total Flying Hours 44,661   
Cost Per Aircraft 954,802 952,742  




F/A – 18B 2000 
  Then Year Dollars 
Constant FY02 
Dollars Count 
1.2.4.1.1.1 AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy 1,629,148 1,712,910  
1.2.4.1.1.2 AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines    
1.2.4.1.2.1 AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy  205,272 215,826  
1.2.4.1.2.2 AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines    
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs    
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs    
4.1.2.4.1.1.1 FRS AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy 513,604 522,965  
4.1.2.4.1.1.2 FRS AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines 1,516,594 1,544,236  
4.1.2.4.1.2.1 FRS AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy 1,755,240 1,845,484  
4.1.2.4.1.2.2 FRS AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines 1,271,105 1,336,458  
1.2.5.1 Fuel Costs- Navy 221,161 232,532  
1.2.5.2 Fuel Costs- Marines 160,159 168,393  
4.1.2.5.1 FRS Fuel Costs- Navy 897,183 1,436,412  
4.1.2.5.2 FRS Fuel Costs - Marines    
  660,605 1,057,645  
  489,582 783,833  
2.1.2 Intermediate Civilian Personnel Costs    
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs    
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Navy 26,000 28,215  
7.1.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Marines 11,000 11,200  
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Navy 1,076,997 1,096,627  
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines    
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines 72,072 73,386  
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy    
A1.1.2 Regular Aircraft Number- Marines    
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   9
A1.2.2 FRS Aircraft Number- Marines    
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   7
A2.1.2 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Marines   4
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy   1,233
A2.2.2 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Marines    
Total Then Year   950
Total Constant Year   629
Total Number of Aircraft $      10,505,722     
Total Flying Hours   $  12,066,122   
Cost Per Aircraft 20   
Cost Per Flying Hour 2,812   
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1.2.4.1.1.1 AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy 1,539,709 1,579,027  
1.2.4.1.1.2 AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines    
1.2.4.1.2.1 AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy  352,593 361,597  
1.2.4.1.2.2 AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines    
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs    
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs    
4.1.2.4.1.1.1 FRS AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy 1,139,245 1,143,476  
4.1.2.4.1.1.2 FRS AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines 750,203 752,989  
4.1.2.4.1.2.1 FRS AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy 2,000,144 2,051,220  
4.1.2.4.1.2.2 FRS AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines 1,335,600 1,369,706  
1.2.5.1 Fuel Costs- Navy 458,033 469,730  
1.2.5.2 Fuel Costs- Marines 305,852 313,662  
4.1.2.5.1 FRS Fuel Costs- Navy 1,105,063 1,087,874  
4.1.2.5.2 FRS Fuel Costs - Marines    
  1,779,057 1,751,385  
  864,797 851,346  
2.1.2 Intermediate Civilian Personnel Costs    
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs    
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Navy 16,803 17,540  
7.1.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Marines 562 564  
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Navy 1,810,998 1,817,724  
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines    
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines 186,003 186,694  
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy    
A1.1.2 Regular Aircraft Number- Marines    
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   9
A1.2.2 FRS Aircraft Number- Marines    
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   7
A2.1.2 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Marines   4
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy   1,528
A2.2.2 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Marines    
Total Then Year   1,480
Total Constant Year   680
Total Number of Aircraft $   13,644,662     
Total Flying Hours   $   13,754,534   
Cost Per Aircraft 20   
Cost Per Flying Hour 3,688   
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F/A – 18B 2002 
  
Then Year    
Dollars 
Constant FY02    
Dollars Count 
1.2.4.1.1.1 AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy 2,382,836 2,375,946  
1.2.4.1.1.2 AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines    
1.2.4.1.2.1 AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy  302,620 301,744  
1.2.4.1.2.2 AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines    
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs    
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs    
4.1.2.4.1.1.1 FRS AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy 2,116,031 2,105,713  
4.1.2.4.1.1.2 FRS AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines 1,095,896 1,090,552  
4.1.2.4.1.2.1 FRS AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy 3,109,426 3,100,435  
4.1.2.4.1.2.2 FRS AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines 2,555,824 2,548,434  
1.2.5.1 Fuel Costs- Navy 394,897 393,756  
1.2.5.2 Fuel Costs- Marines 324,590 323,651  
4.1.2.5.1 FRS Fuel Costs- Navy 2,163,912 2,163,912  
4.1.2.5.2 FRS Fuel Costs - Marines    
  1,300,205 1,300,205  
  946,206 946,206  
2.1.2 Intermediate Civilian Personnel Costs    
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs    
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Navy 27,151 27,151  
7.1.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Marines 22,538 22,428  
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Navy 2,552,033 2,539,589  
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines    
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines 78,230 77,849  
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy    
A1.1.2 Regular Aircraft Number- Marines    
A1.2.1 FRS Aircraft Number- Navy   8
A1.2.2 FRS Aircraft Number- Marines    
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   7
A2.1.2 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Marines   4
A2.2.1 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Navy   1,886
A2.2.2 FRS Annual Flying Hours- Marines    
Total Then Year   1,427
Total Constant Year   854
Total Number of Aircraft $  19,372,395      
Total Flying Hours   $   19,317,571    
Cost Per Aircraft 19    
Cost Per Flying Hour 4,167    
83 
 
F – 5E 2000 
 Then Year Dollars 
Constant FY02 
Dollars Count 
1.2.4.1.1.1 AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy    
1.2.4.1.1.2 AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines    
1.2.4.1.2.1 AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy     
1.2.4.1.2.2 AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines    
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs     
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs     
1.2.5.1 Fuel Costs- Navy  $       1,742,314  $       2,789,488  
1.2.5.2 Fuel Costs- Marines    
2.1.2 Intermediate Civilian Personnel Costs  $         127,000  $         137,819  
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs  $           69,000  $           70,258  
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Navy  $       7,253,964  $       7,386,177  
7.1.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Marines    
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Navy    
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines    
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   20
A1.1.2 Regular Aircraft Number- Marines    
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   4,785
A2.1.2 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Marines    
Total Then Year $       9,192,278      
Total Constant Year    $     10,383,742    
Total Number of Aircraft 20    
Total Flying Hours 4,785    
Cost Per Aircraft 459,614 519,187  




F – 5E 2001 
 Then Year Dollars 
Constant FY02 
Dollars Count 
1.2.4.1.1.1 AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy    
1.2.4.1.1.2 AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines    
1.2.4.1.2.1 AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy     
1.2.4.1.2.2 AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines    
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs  $     10,650,995  $     10,690,550  
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs    
1.2.5.1 Fuel Costs- Navy  $       2,805,448  $       2,761,811  
1.2.5.2 Fuel Costs- Marines    
2.1.2 Intermediate Civilian Personnel Costs    
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs  $             2,176  $             2,184  
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Navy  $       9,899,685  $       9,936,450  
7.1.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Marines    
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Navy    
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines    
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   20
A1.1.2 Regular Aircraft Number- Marines    
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   4,702
A2.1.2 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Marines    
Total Then Year $     23,358,304      
Total Constant Year    $     23,390,995    
Total Number of Aircraft 20    
Total Flying Hours 4,702    
Cost Per Aircraft 1,167,915 1,169,550  




F – 5E 2002 
 Then Year Dollars 
Constant FY02 
Dollars Count 
1.2.4.1.1.1 AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy    
1.2.4.1.1.2 AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines    
1.2.4.1.2.1 AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy     
1.2.4.1.2.2 AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines    
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs  $       6,853,966  $       6,820,545  
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs  $       1,453,678  $       1,446,590  
1.2.5.1 Fuel Costs- Navy  $       2,828,301  $       2,828,301  
1.2.5.2 Fuel Costs- Marines    
2.1.2 Intermediate Civilian Personnel Costs    
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs    
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Navy  $     10,201,440  $     10,151,697  
7.1.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Marines    
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Navy    
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines    
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   20
A1.1.2 Regular Aircraft Number- Marines    
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   4,812
A2.1.2 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Marines    
Total Then Year $     21,337,385      
Total Constant Year    $     21,247,133    
Total Number of Aircraft 20    
Total Flying Hours 4,812    
Cost Per Aircraft 1,066,869 1,062,357  




F – 5F 2000 
 Then Year Dollars 
Constant FY02 
Dollars Count 
1.2.4.1.1.1 AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy    
1.2.4.1.1.2 AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines    
1.2.4.1.2.1 AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy     
1.2.4.1.2.2 AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines    
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs     
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs     
1.2.5.1 Fuel Costs- Navy  $       1,742,314  $       2,789,488  
1.2.5.2 Fuel Costs- Marines  $       1,438,980  $       2,303,842  
2.1.2 Intermediate Civilian Personnel Costs  $         127,000  $         137,819  
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs  $           69,000  $           70,258  
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Navy  $       7,253,964  $       7,386,177  
7.1.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Marines  $       4,790,460  $       4,877,772  
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Navy    
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines    
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   20
A1.1.2 Regular Aircraft Number- Marines   11
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   4,785
A2.1.2 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Marines   3,590
Total Then Year $     15,421,718      
Total Constant Year    $     17,565,356    
Total Number of Aircraft 31    
Total Flying Hours 8,375    
Cost Per Aircraft 497,475 566,624  
Cost Per Flying Hour 1,841           2,097.36    
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F – 5F 2001 
 Then Year Dollars 
Constant FY02 
Dollars Count 
1.2.4.1.1.1 AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy    
1.2.4.1.1.2 AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines    
1.2.4.1.2.1 AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy     
1.2.4.1.2.2 AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines    
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs  $     10,650,995  $     10,690,550  
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs    
1.2.5.1 Fuel Costs- Navy  $       2,805,448  $       2,761,811  
1.2.5.2 Fuel Costs- Marines  $       2,313,631  $       2,277,644  
2.1.2 Intermediate Civilian Personnel Costs    
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs  $             2,176  $             2,184  
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Navy  $       9,899,685  $       9,936,450  
7.1.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Marines  $       7,320,545  $       7,347,732  
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Navy    
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines    
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   20
A1.1.2 Regular Aircraft Number- Marines   12
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   4,702
A2.1.2 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Marines   3,477
Total Then Year $     32,992,480      
Total Constant Year    $     33,016,371    
Total Number of Aircraft 32    
Total Flying Hours 8,179    
Cost Per Aircraft 1,031,015 1,031,762  
Cost Per Flying Hour 4,034           4,036.72    
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F – 5F 2002 
 Then Year Dollars 
Constant FY02 
Dollars Count 
1.2.4.1.1.1 AVDLR Cost of Goods- Navy    
1.2.4.1.1.2 AVDLR Cost of Goods - Marines    
1.2.4.1.2.1 AVDLR Cost Recovery- Navy     
1.2.4.1.2.2 AVDLR Cost Recovery - Marines    
3.1.2 Commercial Aircraft Rework Costs  $       6,853,966  $       6,820,545  
3.3.2 Commercial Aircraft Engine Rework Costs  $       1,453,678  $       1,446,590  
1.2.5.1 Fuel Costs- Navy  $       2,828,301  $       2,828,301  
1.2.5.2 Fuel Costs- Marines  $       2,265,908  $       2,265,908  
2.1.2 Intermediate Civilian Personnel Costs    
2.1.3 Intermediate Contractor Personnel Costs    
7.1.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Navy  $     10,201,440  $     10,151,697  
7.1.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - Regular - Marines  $       6,735,509  $       6,702,666  
7.2.1 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Navy    
7.2.2 Contractor Logistics Support Costs - FRS - Marines    
A1.1.1 Regular Aircraft Number- Navy   20
A1.1.2 Regular Aircraft Number- Marines   12
A2.1.1 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Navy   4,812
A2.1.2 Regular Annual Flying Hours- Marines   3,537
Total Then Year $     30,338,802     
Total Constant Year    $     30,215,707   
Total Number of Aircraft 32    
Total Flying Hours 8,349    
Cost Per Aircraft 948,088 944,241  




APPENDIX C.  F-5E/F STATEMENT OF WORK 
NAVAL TACTICAL AIR WARFARE (NTAW) AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE 




Program Manager Air 225 (PMA225) is delegated authority from and is ultimately 
responsible and accountable to the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command 
(COMNAVAIRSYSCOM).  Primary support responsibilities for management of the 
aviation logistics support program are exercised through the Assistant Commander for 
Fleet Support and Field Activity Management (AIR-4.0).  PMA225 has been tasked by 
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM to provide contract maintenance, logistics management, and 
administration in support of this Statement of Work (SOW) which provides the concept, 




The services described herein shall be performed in accordance with OPNAVINST 
4790.2 series.  The Contractor shall provide and maintain organizational (O), 
intermediate (I), limited DEPOT (D) level aircraft maintenance, management, 
logistics support services and other services as specified herein for aircraft based at 
Fighter Composite Reserve Thirteen (VFC-13) Fallon NV, and Marine Fighter 
Squadron Training (VMFT-401) in Yuma AZ (approximately 32 F-5E, and 4 F-5F). 
 
1.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS 
 
1.2.1 F-5E/F: The (E) single-place and (F) two-place are high-performance multi-
purpose tactical fighters.  Two GE J85-21 gas turbine engines equipped with 
afterburners power the aircraft. 
 
1.3 SUPPORT CONCEPT 
 
The most important Contractor performance criteria is to provide safe flyable 
aircraft to complete the Navy’s daily flight schedule (see site specific addenda, 
attachments 1A and 1B, paragraph 3.4). 
 
The Contractor shall provide O, I, and limited D level aircraft maintenance for Naval 
Tactical Air Warfare (NTAW) assets. This shall include associated support equipment, 
power plants, airframes, aviation life support systems, electronic and electrical 
instruments, armament radar/fire control and flight line services in order to meet the 
flying programs of each activity and its daily mission requirements as stated in each Site 
Specific Addendum. Organizational, Intermediate, and limited DEPOT level maintenance 
is that maintenance which is performed at the site where the aircraft are permanently 
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assigned or on temporary detachment.  The Contractor’s management shall be structured 
to ensure that aircraft are maintained to achieve maximum utilization of all assets.  
 
The Navy places special emphasis on hydraulic contamination, Foreign Object Damage 
(FOD) prevention, tool control, record keeping, compass calibration, corrosion 
prevention and treatment, tire and wheel maintenance safety, fuel surveillance, oil 
analysis, support equipment operator training, nondestructive inspection, plane captain 
training, survival and egress systems maintenance, and individual qualifications.  In 
performance of the services described herein, the Contractor shall maintain an efficient 
organization, provide adequate supervisory control, and perform all maintenance and 
other services as specified for the approximate number of aircraft at the following 
locations: 
 
SITE   UNIT  T/M/S  QNTY. 
 
NAS Fallon  VFC-13 F-5E/F     23 
MCAS Yuma  VMF 401 F-5E/F     13 
 
The Contractor shall be fully responsible for the correction of all damage and/or defects, 
within the limitation of liability, which are incurred that are directly attributed to the 
Contractor’s performance or actions under this contract. 
 
1.4 GOVERNMENT ROLE 
 
The Government’s role includes monitoring Contractor performance; managing the 
Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization flight manual; Government 
Furnished Equipment (GFE), facilities, limited Support Equipment.  Access to Support 
Equipment is provided on a no-cost basis as described in attachments referenced herein.  
The Government reserves the right to review/verify maintenance actions accomplished by 
the Contractor, monitor and evaluate maintenance data, review Contractor maintenance 
reports, conduct unscheduled periodic inspections and audits, and observe cleanliness and 
general maintenance practices. 
 
The assigned US Navy representatives will have responsibilities for the execution of this 




1.4.1 Program Manager Air 
 
The Program Manager Air  (PMA) for the F-5 aircraft is PMA225.  The PMA is located 
at COMNAVAIRSYSCOM Patuxent River MD.   
 
1.4.2  Fleet Support Team  
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The Fleet Support Team (FST) is the in-service engineering and logistics authority for 
assigned weapon systems.  The FST has responsibility for review and approval of 
changes to specifications and drawings.  The FST members have a direct interface with 
fleet activities, aircraft controlling custodians and PMA offices on engineering and 
logistics matters related to their assigned programs.  The appropriate FST for each 
aircraft type/model/series (T/M/S) is assigned by the cognizant NAVAIR PMA. 
 
1.4.3 Assistant Program Manager For Logistics 
 
Assistant Program Manager for Logistics (AMPL) will provide logistics management 
support for the F-5 platform under this contract. 
 
1.4.4 Maintenance Monitoring Team) 
 
The Maintenance Monitoring Team (MMT) will perform the func tions as assigned by the 
COR.  The duties of Navy Quality Assurance (QA) personnel become the responsibility 
of the Contractor’s inspector.  MMT verifies that Contractor quality assurance is planned 
properly and carried out. This surveillance and inspection of the Contractor’s 
performance is described in NTAW Contract Maintenance Monitoring Plan (CMMP).  
 
Government Flight Representative 
 
The Contractor is required to comply with the regulations governing ground operations 
contained in NAVAIRINST 3710.1 series.  In the case of this maintenance contract the 
Government Flight Representative (GFR) responsibilities will include surveillance of 
Contractor ground operations involving Government aircraft and other aircraft for which 
the Government assumes at least some of the risk of loss or damage.  Specifically these 
duties will include reviewing Contractor performance to ensure the Contractor is 
performing in accordance with OPNAV 4790.2 series, Engine Operation Procedures, and 
verifying Contractor certifications and training.  The GFR shall conduct these reviews at 
least once a year.  The GFR will compile a report and will notify the Contractor in 
writing when the review is completed.  Deficiencies will be cited to the Contractor with a 
copy to the ACO.  The GFR will establish a 30-day suspense for corrective action. 
 
1.5 SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS  
 
A separate Maintenance Department with a dedicated workforce shall be established and 
maintained for VFC-13, and VMFT-401, individually.  
 
The Contractor shall provide O, selected I and limited D level aircraft maintenance.   
This maintenance shall include associated support equipment, power plants, airframes, 
aviation life support systems, electronic and electrical instruments, armament radar/fire 
control and flight line services in order to meet the flying programs of each activity and 
its daily mission requirements as stated in each Site Specific Addendum. O, selected I and 
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limited D level maintenance is that maintenance which is performed at the site where the 
aircraft are permanently assigned or on temporary detachment.   
 
The Contractor’s maintenance program shall comply with all provisions of the Chief of 
Naval Operations (OPNAV) approved maintenance plans and instructions and 
applicable maintenance manuals and all requirements specified herein. The Government 
will issue any waivers or deviations on a case-by-case basis in accordance with this 
contract.  In achieving this requirement, the Contractor shall meet the OPNAV objective 
of continually improving material readiness and safety with the optimum use of economic 
resources. 
 
1.6 QUALITY MANAGEMENT 
 
The Contractor shall develop, maintain and implement a quality management plan and 
Maintenance Monitoring Plan and incorporate an effective systemic improvement 
process for programs not meeting the specific requirements of OPNAV, 
NAVAIRSYSCOM, COMNAVAIRPAC, COMNAVAIRLANT, COMNAVAIRESFOR, 
Air Force Technical Orders, local Wing and Squadron instructions and subsequent 
changes  
 
2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
 
The applicable documents listed below form a part of the basic SOW and the Specific Site 
Addenda. The Contractor shall comply with all applicable instructions, directives, 
regulations and orders. Every instruction/regulation is not specifically recreated or listed 
herein.  The following is a list of basic governing documents upon which local 
regulations are based: 
 
FEDERAL AND NATIONAL REGULATIONS 
 
See Section I Clauses 
 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) 
 
DODINST 
4000.25-1-M  Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures 
(MILSTRIP) 
4145.19-R-1   Storage and Material Handling 
4160.2M         Defense Reutilization and Marketing Manual (DRMO) 







3710.7 Series NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions 
4110.2 Series Navy Hazardous Material Control Program Manual 
4790.2 Series NAVAL Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) 
5090.1 Series Environmental and Natural Resources Program Manual 
5100.23 Series Navy Occupational Safety and Health 
5442.2 Series Aircraft Inventory Reporting System 
5530.14 Series  DON Physical Security and Loss Prevention 
11103.1 Series Adequacy, Assignment and utilization of Bachelor Quarters  
 
TYPE COMMANDER INSTRUCTIONS AND DIRECTIVES  
 
Furnished at the technical library at each command at NAS Fallon NV, and MCAS Yuma 
AZ. 
 
JOINT TRAVEL REGULATIONS (JTR), VOL. II  
 
PUB 80-106 DEPT. OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND WELFARE (NATIONAL 
  INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH), 
  Criteria and Recommended Standards for Working in Confined Spaces 
 
Specific applicable instructions and regulations will be provided at each site as required. 
 
3.0 FLIGHT SCHEDULE COMMITMENTS 
 
The Contractor shall perform all maintenance necessary to ensure operational readiness 
and availability of aircraft necessary to meet the flight schedules.  All aircraft 
assigned/issued by the Contractor shall have enough flight hours available to meet the 
assigned mission before reaching any scheduled maintenance requirement.  All 
aircraft/issued, by the Contractor, for cross-country flight shall have enough flight hours 
available to meet the mission requirements as determined by the Government. 
 
It is required that aircraft taxi from the line no later than 5 minutes past their published 
launch time.  If launch window is not met, it will be counted as a maintenance-caused 
mission abort with the exception of delays caused by factors not under Contractor 
control (e.g. weather, operations).  A projected schedule of planned operations will be 
provided monthly by the activity, and will project through the upcoming three months to 
aid in planning. Saturday, Sunday, and holiday work will be necessary to meet squadron 
requirements. See Site Specific Addenda. 
 
3.1 OPERATIONAL READINESS 
 
The Contractor shall maintain aircraft in a state of operational readiness to meet daily 
operational mission requirements.  It is inherent in meeting mission commitments that 
operational aircraft are available for flight.  If the daily operational mission 
requirements of 80% are not being completed due to a 10% or greater lack of mission 
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capable aircraft, the Contractor shall submit a corrective action plan within 3 calendar 
days to the Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) and the Contracting Officer.  
Additionally, if the contractor is not meeting the monthly flight hour requirements 
specified in each site specific addendum, the contractor shall submit a corrective action 
plan within 3 calendar days after the end of the month to the Contracting Officer.  The 
Contractor shall comply with Commander, Naval Air Reserve Forces, 4th MAW, CVWR-
20, and local directives to ensure effective use of all aircraft throughout their predicted 
service life. 
 
3.2 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND SURGE CAPABILITY 
 
The Contractor shall provide capability for surge.  
See each Site Specific Addenda.  
 
3.3 REQUIRED AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY 
 
See Site Specific Addenda.  
 
4.0 ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL MAINTENANCE 
 
The Contractor shall perform all organizational level (O-level) maintenance in 
accordance with this SOW and the Site Specific Addenda to include those maintenance 
functions normally performed by an operating unit on a day-to-day basis in support of its 
mission and in accordance with OPNAVINST 4790.2 series.  
 
4.1 TRANSIENT SERVICES  
 
The Contractor shall perform transient line functions to include directing, parking, 
securing, aircraft fire guard, and assistance to flight crew for transient Tactical Air 
Warfare Program aircraft as directed by the Government.    See Site Specific Addenda. 
 
4.2 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE 
 
The Contractor shall perform corrective maintenance In Accordance With (IAW) 




The aircraft will routinely deploy to other USN/USAF/USMC bases for unit training 
missions.  Deployment bases/stations will provide the normal transient type servicing 
support (normally fuel and liquid oxygen).  The Contractor shall be responsible for on-
aircraft servicing and maintenance. See Site Specific Addenda. 
 
4.3.1 Detachment Support 
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The Contractor shall provide the support described in this contract for detachment 
support operations outside assigned station boundaries.  In the event assigned aircraft 
are not mission capable at a location other than assigned station, the Contractor shall 
provide the necessary maintenance support.  Travel and per diem shall be approved in 
advance by the COR.  
 
Detachments and services shall be required in support of a combination of aircraft of 
various type/model/series.  When Contractor personnel performing maintenance remain 
overnight at locations other than assigned station, per diem shall be paid at a rate not to 
exceed the rates specified in the Joint Travel Regulations (JTR). Personnel may utilize off 
base accommodations only when Government quarters are not available.  Authorization 
for use of other than Government quarters must be covered by a certification of non-
availability or justification by the COR.  Reimbursement will be based upon JTR.  Travel 
claims shall be completed and invoiced to the Government within 5 working days upon 
completion of travel. 
 
(NOTE:  The Contractor shall prepare and submit to the COR for approval “Invitational 
Orders” for all personnel authorized to perform off-site support.  All travel shall be in 
accordance with the Joint Travel Regulations, Vol. II and OPNAVINST 11103.1.) 
 
The following equivalency schedule shall apply to all personnel: 
 
  Site Manager - GS-13 
  Assistant site manager - GS-12 
  Leadmen/Senior Technicians - GS-9/GS-11 
  Mechanics - WG-8 
 
When performing at a detached site, the Contractor shall replace at the detached site, at no 
cost to the Government, personnel who have voluntarily terminated, who have been 
terminated by the Contractor, or who have been removed from the detached site due to 
misconduct. 
 
Travel and per diem costs incurred in the replacement and/or relocation of personnel will 
not be reimbursed when such replacement and/or relocation is accomplished for the 
Contractor’s or employee’s convenience.  Paid, itemized receipts shall substantiate 
invoices.  At the Government’s discretion, Government -furnished transportation may be 
provided in lieu of commercial transportation.  Anticipate delays in excess of 4 hours 10% 
of the time when Government transportation is provided. 
 
4.4 FUNCTIONAL CHECK FLIGHTS 
 
The Contractor shall support all Functional Check Flights (FCF), in accordance with 
OPNAVINST 4790.2 series and NAVAIRINST 3710.1 with the exception of in flight 
operations.  In order for an aircraft to be in an FCF status all required work on the 
aircraft shall be completed.  Aircraft shall be preflighted, fueled appropriately for its 
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designated mission, systems serviced, located on the required launch spot and ready for 
FCF crew preflight. 
 
5.0 INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE 
 
The Contractor shall provide Intermediate (“I”) Level Maintenance and manage 
Production Control and Maintenance Control functions separately. Intermediate level 
maintenance encompasses; radar repair, Nondestructive Inspection (NDI)/X -ray, and 
welding; and engine repair.  I level repair capabilities shall be shared between sites (see 
site specific addenda, attachments 1A and 1B). 
 
6.0 LIMITED DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE 
 
The Contractor shall provide limited D level maintenance support for the Naval Tactical 
Air Warfare Program.  All limited D level maintenance shall be provided as an Over and 
Above action on a case by case basis.  Examples of limited D level maintenance support 
for the F-5E/F aircraft include modification, component repair, aircraft paint (other than 
corrosion control), repair and/or replacement of airframe structural components/aircraft 
strain gauges, and integration/installation of various avionics modifications. The 
Contractor may seek engineering support from non-Government sources with 
Government/TYCOM approval.  Non-Government  engineering work must be approved 
by the FST. 
 
9.0 GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, AND 
PROPERTY  
 
The Contractor shall manage Government Furnished Property in accordance with the 
Government Furnished Property Clauses contained in Section I of this contract, Federal 
Acquisition Regulations, Subpart 45, and other program requirements.  These shall 
include but are  not limited to, the IMRL Program, Tool Control Program, D Level 
Repairable Material Program, Plant and Minor Property requirements, and Navy Supply 
System regulations, instructions and directives.  
 
The Contractor shall maintain site specific records of all Government Furnished 
Property per the requirements of FAR Subpart 45. The Contractor shall use and maintain 
an automated accounting system for accountability, tracking and inventory of all 
Government Furnished Property regardless of cost.  This system shall be used for all 
Government Property except IMRL, which shall be tracked and accounted for using the 
Government Furnished IMRL Program.  Contractor records are the official Government 
records in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations, Subpart 45.  All Property 
CDRLs, including contract Phase out turn over records, shall be submitted in EXCEL 
format. 
 
a.  The Contractor sha ll develop and submit, for Contracting Officer Approval, a 
Property Control Plan/System in accordance with FAR Subpart 45 and the property 
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clauses identified in Section I of this contract.  This Property Control plan shall 
incorporate the provisions and requirements of identified property instructions and 
directives for the accountability, control, use, protection, preservation, inventory, 
movement, disposition, and maintenance of Government Furnished Property.  This 
Property Control Plan is required thirty days after contract award.  Proposed changes to 
the plan must be submitted to the PCO for approval prior to implementation. 
 
b.  The Contractor shall be liable for loss or damage to Government furnished 
property in accordance with the Government Property Clauses contained in Section I of 
this Contract.  In the case of loss or damage, the Contracting Officer shall determine the 
amount of the Contractor’s liability. The Contractor shall verbally notify the COR within 
24 hours of discovery of lost, damaged or destroyed Government Property and provide 
written notification within (5) workdays after verbal notification.  The written report 
shall be in accordance with FAR 45 requirements for Lost, Damage or Destroyed 
(LD&D) Government Property.  The Contractor shall also prepare and submit a Missing, 
Lost, Stolen and recovered (MLSR) Report per SECNAVINST 5500.4.  The official 
property records shall be adjusted with an approved DD Form 200, Survey document for 
all loss or destroyed Government Furnished Property.  
 
c.  The Contractor shall dispose of Government Property per direction of the CORs 
and the Property Administrator.  Government Property turned into Defense Reutilization 
and Marketing Office (DRMO) shall be documented and processed per DODINST 
4160.2M and local Installation instructions. 
 
9.1 USE OF THE FEDERAL SUPPLY SYSTEM 
 
The Contractor shall use the Federal Supply System for the requisition of all materials.  
The Contractor shall perform this function using the standard DD-1348 
MILSTRIP/MILSTRAP ordering procedures.  When approved by the APML, the 
Contractor shall be authorized to commercially procure, refurbish, and/or manufacture 
the material when such material is not available in the Federal Supply System or can be 
procured commercially at a significant cost saving to the Government. 
 
9.2 PHYSICAL INVENTORY 
 
The Contractor shall, as a minimum, annually or as directed by the COR, conduct a wall 
to wall physical inventory of Government-furnished material/equipment/property in 
Contractor custody in accordance with FAR, Subpart 45 and other program directives.  
Physical inventories shall be conducted annually within 30 days of award and 30 days 
after exercise of each subsequent contract option year.  Physical inventories shall be in 
accordance with directives and instructions for type of Government Property inventoried.  
Aviation DEPOT Level Repairable material shall be inventoried Quarterly per 
NAVSUPINST 4440.115 series.  IMRL shall be inventoried per NAVAIR, OPNAV and 
Type Commander Instructions.  Tools and Support Equipment shall be inventoried per 
NAVAIR, OPNAV and Type Commander Instructions.  Plant and Minor Property and 
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consumable material shall be inventoried per NAVSUPINST and local instructions.  The 
Contractor shall develop and submit an annual inventory schedule for all Government 
Furnished Property. Inventory results shall be submitted in accordance with direction 
provided for CDRL submission  (see site specific addenda, attachments 1A and 1B). 
 
9.3 INVENTORY ADDITIONS AND DELETIONS 
 
The Government may establish new inventory items not previously listed on the 
Government -furnished material (GFM) list and/or elect to change (at the Government’s 
option) the quantity of items on the GFM list.  The Contractor shall requisition or 
purchase additional items when approved by the cognizant APML/TYCOM.  The 
Contractor shall initiate and sustain timely repair/replenishment of the GFM to meet 
contractual requirements.   
 
Contractor justification and recommendations for additions to the GFM shall be 
forwarded via the TYCOM to the cognizant APML when the Contractor observes 
usage/failure trends warranting additional spares inventory.  All Contractor requests for 
additions to the GFM shall be negotiated on a case-by-case basis.  Deletions to the GFM 
list shall be approved by the APML and transferred or redistributed in accordance with 
instructions to be provided by the TYCOM.  The Contractor shall maintain the supply of 




The Contractor shall initiate and maintain a standard format of reports.  These reports 
shall be submitted to the Government, as stated in Exhibit A of the contract. 
 
e. Aircraft Status Report – The Contractor shall provide an Aircraft Status Report 
IAW CDRL, DD Form 1423, Item A005. 
 
i. Daily Aircraft Readiness Status Report – The Contractor shall provide a Daily 
Aircraft Readiness Status Report IAW CDRL, DD Form 1423, Item A009. 
 
t. F-5E/F Special Interest Items (Top 20 Problem Items)  - The Contractor shall 
provide an F-5E/F Special Interest Items (Top 20 Problems Items) reports IAW CDRL, 






APPENDIX D.  F/A-18A/B STATEMENT OF WORK 
NAVAL TACTICAL AIR WARFARE (NTAW) AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE  




Program Manager Air 225 (PMA-225) is delegated authority from and is ultimately 
responsible and accountable to the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command 
(COMNAVAIRSYSCOM).  Primary support responsibilities for management of the 
aviation logistics support program are exercised through the Assistant Commander for 
Fleet Support and Field Activity Management (AIR-4.0).  PMA-225 has been tasked by 
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM to provide contract maintenance, logistics management, and 
administration in support of this Statement of Work (SOW) which provides the concept, 




The services described herein shall be performed in accordance with OPNAVINST 
4790.2 series.  The Contractor shall provide and maintain organizational, 
intermediate, and limited DEPOT level aircraft maintenance, management, logistics 
support services and other services as specified herein for aircraft based at Naval 
Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC), Fallon NV (Approximately 26 F/A-
18A/B, 7 F-14A, and 2 SH-6 and 2 HH-60 helicopters).  Aircraft to be included at a 
later date upon exercise of contract option include the F-16A/B.  Additionally, the 
Contractor shall provide transient services for F-14B/D, F/A-18C/D, and E-2C 
aircraft at NAS Fallon. 
 
The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) combines the functions of the Naval 
Strike Warfare Center (NSWC), Navy Fighter Weapons School (NFWS), and the Carrier 
Airborne Early Warning Weapons School (CAEWWS), into a single command structure 
to enhance aviation training effectiveness.  It focuses on tactics development, assessment, 
graduate level training, Fallon Range Complex management, joint interoperability, and 
standardization of training within the aviation communities.  Additionally, NSAWC will 
emphasize cross-community dialogue on an integrated tactical employment of naval 
assets, and have a role in the requirement process for aviation. 
 
NSAWC will also act to improve and maintain at a high level, naval force overland strike 
and war-at-sea capabilities and provide the basis for training to include all warfare areas 
currently required, or foreseen as required.  This command melds aviation requirement 
recommendations and priorities for Research and Development (R&D), procurement and 
training in support of integrated Strike Warfare and associated strike planning support 
systems to the type commands.  NSAWC provides direct intelligence and tactical 
doctrine support to deploying/deployed naval forces conducting contingency 
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planning/operations as directed by national tasking.  Upon mobilization, NSAWC will 
fulfill operational and intelligence requirements in support of wartime tasking and 
perform such other functions or tasks as may be directed by higher authority. 
 
1.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS 
 
1.2.2 F/A-18A/B/C/D: The McDonnell Douglas F-/A-18 is an all-weather fighter and 
attack aircraft.  In its fighter mode, the F/A-18 is used primarily as a fighter escort and for 
fleet air defense.  In its attack mode it is used for force projection, interdiction and close 
and deep air support. Single-place (A) and two-place (B) are fighter/attack aircraft powered 
by two General Electric F404-GE-400 turbofan engines with afterburner.  The F/A-18C/D 
is powered by two F404-GE-402 enhanced performance turbofan engines. 
 
1.3 SUPPORT CONCEPT 
 
The most important Contractor performance criterion is to provide safe flyable 
aircraft to complete the Navy’s daily flight schedule. 
 
The Contractor shall provide organizational (O), intermediate (I), and limited Depot (D) 
level aircraft maintenance for Naval Tactical Air Warfare (NTAW) assets.  This shall 
include associated support equipment, power plants, airframes, aviation life support 
systems, electronic and electrical instruments, armament radar/fire control and flight line 
services in order to meet the flying programs of each activity and its daily mission 
requirements. O, I, and limited D level maintenance is that maintenance which is 
performed at the site where the aircraft are permanently assigned or on temporary 
detachment.  The Contractor’s management shall be structured to ensure that aircraft are 
maintained to achieve maximum utilization of all assets.  
 
The Navy places special emphasis on hydraulic contamination, Foreign Object Damage 
(FOD) prevention, tool control, record keeping, compass calibration, corrosion 
prevention and treatment, tire and wheel maintenance safety, fuel surveillance, oil 
analysis, support equipment operator training, nondestructive inspection, plane captain 
training, survival and egress systems maintenance, and individual qualifications.  In 
performance of the services described herein, the Contractor shall maintain an efficient 
organization, provide adequate supervisory control, and perform all maintenance and 
other services as specified for the approximate number of aircraft at the following 
locations: 
 
SITE   UNIT  T/M/S  QNTY. 
 
 NAS Fallon  NSAWC F-14A       7 
 NAS Fallon  NSAWC F/A-18A    22 
 NAS Fallon  NSAWC F/A-18B      4 
 NAS Fallon  NSAWC SH-60/HH-60     4 
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The Contractor shall be fully responsible for the correction of all damage and/or defects, 
within the limitation of liability, which are incurred that are directly attributed to the 
Contractor’s performance or actions under this contract. 
 
1.4 GOVERNMENT ROLE 
 
The Government’s role includes monitoring Contractor performance; managing the 
Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization flight manual; Government 
Furnished Equipment (GFE), facilities, limited Support Equipment.  Access to Support 
Equipment is provided on a no-cost basis as described in attachments referenced herein.  
The Government reserves the right to review/verify maintenance actions accomplished by 
the Contractor, monitor and evaluate maintenance data, review Contractor maintenance 
reports, conduct unscheduled periodic inspections and audits, and observe cleanliness and 
general maintenance practices. 
 
The assigned US Navy representatives will have responsibilities for the execution of this 
SOW as follows:  
 
1.4.1 Program Manager Air 
 
The Program Manager Air  (PMA) for the F-14A aircraft is PMA 241, F/A-18A/B is 
PMA 265, SH-60/HH-60 is PMA 299, and the E-2C is PMA 231.  All PMAs are located 
at COMNAVAIRSYSCOM Patuxent River MD.   
 
1.4.2  Fleet Support Team  
 
The Fleet Support Team (FST) is the in-service engineering and logistics authority for 
assigned weapon systems.  The FST has responsibility for review and approval of 
changes to specifications and drawings.  The FST members have a direct interface with 
fleet activities, aircraft controlling custodians and PMA offices on engineering and 
logistics matters related to their assigned programs.  The appropriate FST for each 
aircraft type/model/series (T/M/S) is assigned by the cognizant NAVAIR PMA. 
 
1.4.3 Assistant Program Manager For Logistics 
 
Each  aircraft (T/M/S) Assistant Program Manager for Logistics (AMPL) will provide 
logistics management support for its platform under this contract. 
 
1.4.4 Maintenance Monitoring Team 
 
The Maintenance Monitoring Team (MMT) will perform the functions as assigned by the 
COR.  The duties of Navy Quality Assurance (QA) personnel become the responsibility 
of the Contractor’s inspector.  MMT verifies that Contractor quality assurance is planned 
properly and carried out. This surveillance and inspection of the Contractor’s 
performance is described in NTAW Contract Maintenance Monitoring Plan (CMMP).  
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Government Flight Representative 
 
The Contractor is required to comply with the regulations governing ground operations 
contained in NAVAIRINST 3710.1 series.  In the case of this maintenance contract the 
Government Flight Representative (GFR) responsibilities will include surveillance of 
Contractor ground operations involving Government aircraft and other aircraft for which 
the Government assumes at least some of the risk of loss or damage.  Specifically these 
duties will include reviewing Contractor performance to ensure the Contractor is 
performing in accordance with OPNAV 4790.2, Engine Operation Procedures, and 
verifying Contractor certifications and training.  The GFR shall conduct these reviews at 
least once a year.  The GFR will compile a report and will notify the Contractor in 
writing when the review is completed.  Deficiencies will be cited to the Contractor with a 
copy to the ACO.  The GFR will establish a 30-day suspense for corrective action. 
 
1.4.6  Procurement Contracting Officer (PCO) 
 
The Government Procurement Contracting Officer directs and administers the acquisition 
through the award of the contract. After award, the PCO will designate, in writing, the 
Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) for the administration of the terms and 
provisions of this SOW as stipulated in the contract.  
 
1.4.7  Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO)  
 
The ACO performs functions assigned by PCO related to the administration of the 
contract.  See FAR Parts 42 and 46. 
 
1.4.8  Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR)   
 
The COR is a  representative appointed by the PCO to serve as technical liaison between 
Government and Contractor for a specific contract.  The COR performs primarily 
technical and oversight functions in accordance with FAR Part 46.  The PCO can 
designate Government personnel to act as authorized representatives.  To include such 
functions as providing to Contractors technical direction, inspection, approval of shop 
drawings, testing, approval of samples, and other functions of a technical or 
administrative nature not involving a change in the scope, price, terms or conditions of 
the contract or order.  The COR monitors the Contractor’s performance and provides 
technical advice to the PCO and Contractor within the scope of the SOW. 
 
The COR and Alternate COR (ACOR) shall be nominated by the Commanding Officer of 
each activity and appointed in writing by the PCO as the contract representative for all 
matters concerning the Contractor’s services received by the activities. 
 
1.5 SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS  
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The Contractor shall provide O, I and limited D level aircraft maintenance.  This 
maintenance shall include associated support equipment, power plants, airframes, 
aviation life support systems, electronic and electrical instruments, armament radar/fire 
control and flight line services in order to meet the flying programs of each activity and 
its daily mission requirements.  O,  I, and limited D level maintenance is that 
maintenance which is performed at the site where the aircraft are permanently assigned or 
on temporary detachment.   
 
The Contractor’s maintenance program shall comply with all provisions of the Chief of 
Naval Operations (OPNAV) approved maintenance plans and instructions and applicable 
maintenance manuals and all requirements specified herein. The Government will issue 
any waivers or deviations on a case-by-case basis in accordance with this contract.  In 
achieving this requirement, the Contractor shall meet the OPNAV objective of 
continually improving material readiness and safety with the optimum use of economic 
resources.  
 
1.6 QUALITY MANAGEMENT 
 
The Contractor shall develop, maintain and implement a quality management plan and 
Maintenance Monitoring Plan and incorporate an effective systemic improvement 
process for programs not meeting the specific requirements of OPNAV, 
NAVAIRSYSCOM, COMNAVAIRPAC, COMNAVAIRLANT, COMNAVAIRESFOR, 
Air Force Technical Orders, local Wing and Squadron instructions and subsequent 
changes.  
 
1.7 TERMS, DEFINITIONS, AND ABBREVIATIONS  (NSAWC ONLY) 
  
All terms/definitions are in accordance with OPNAVINST 3710.7 and 4790.2 series.  
 
1.7.1  Contractor Sortie  Aircraft is physically airborne, lands, and completed 
its  
           (KRSC)   mission 
 
1.7.2  Contractor Mission  Aircraft performs all requirements as set forth in the 
          Complete (KRMCP)   flight schedule without abort for maintenance 
failure  
and training is accomplished = number of KRSC  
minus maintenance aborts. 
 
1.7.3  Contractor Mission  Number of flights scheduled minus OA and minus 
          (KRMS)   WA Scheduled 
 
1.7.4  Contractor Mission  Mission Completed =  KRMCP divided by KRMS 
           Completion Rate 
           (KRMCR) 
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1.7.5  Contractor Mission          Mission Capable (MC) minus NMCS and minus 
Capable (KRMC)                           Planning &Estimating (P&E) 
 
2.0 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
 
The applicable documents listed below form a part of the basic SOW and the Specific 
Site Addenda. The Contractor shall comply with all applicable instructions, directives, 
regulations and orders.  The following is a list of basic governing documents upon which 
local regulations are based: 
 
FEDERAL AND NATIONAL REGULATIONS 
 
See Section I Clauses 
 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) 
 
DODINST 
4000.25-1-M  Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures 
(MILSTRIP) 
4145.19-R-1   Storage and Material Handling 
4160.2M         Defense Reutilization and Marketing Manual (DRMO) 






3710.7 Series NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions 
4110.2 Series Navy Hazardous Material Control Program Manual 
4790.2 Series NAVAL Aviation Maintenance Program (NAMP) 
5090.1 Series Environmental and Natural Resources Program Manual 
5100.23 Series Navy Occupational Safety and Health 
5442.2 Series Aircraft Inventory Reporting System 
5530.14 Series  DON Physical Security and Loss Prevention 
11103.1 Series Adequacy, Assignment and utilization of Bachelor Quarters  
 
TYPE COMMANDER INSTRUCTIONS AND DIRECTIVES  
 
Furnished at the technical library at each command. 
 
JOINT TRAVEL REGULATIONS (JTR), VOL. II  
 
PUB 80-106 DEPT. OF HEALTH EDUCATION AND WELFARE (NATIONAL 
  INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH), 
105 
  Criteria and Recommended Standards for Working in Confined Spaces 
 
Specific applicable instructions and regulations will be provided at each site as required. 
 
3.0 FLIGHT SCHEDULE COMMITMENTS 
 
The Contractor shall perform all maintenance necessary to ensure operational readiness 
and availability of aircraft necessary to meet the flight schedules. The Contractor shall 
provide safe, flyable aircraft configured to accomplish the mission identified in the daily 
flight schedule.  All aircraft assigned/issued by the Contractor shall have enough flight 
hours available to meet the assigned mission before reaching any scheduled maintenance 
requirement.  All aircraft issued, by the Contractor, for cross-country flights shall have 
enough flight hours available to meet the mission requirements as determined by the 
Government. 
 
It is required that aircraft taxi from the line no later than 5 minutes past their published 
launch time.  If launch window is not met, it will be counted as a maintenance-caused 
mission abort with the exception of delays caused by factors not under Contractor control 
(e.g. weather, operations).  A projected schedule of planned operations will be provided 
monthly by the activity, and will project through the upcoming three months to aid in 
planning. Saturday, Sunday, and holiday work will be necessary to meet squadron 
requirements. 
 
Approximately 34% of the total flight operations are routinely scheduled for six (6) days 
per week.  Normal workday operations required that aircraft supporting these operations 
launch as early as 0600 and as late as 2200.   
 
The remaining flight operations (approximately 66%) are routinely scheduled to 
encompass a 12-hour flying day, 5 days per week.  The normal flight schedule for aircraft 
supporting these operations will be between 0700 and 1900; and weekend flying is 
ESTIMATED to occur twice per month Saturday and Sunday. 
 
However, in both cases, aircraft may be required to launch earlier or recover later to 
accommodate operational requirements and may include up to 5 legal holidays.  
Extended training flights will typically launch on Friday afternoon or evening.  There are 
approximately 6 extended training flights per week. 
 
3.1 OPERATIONAL READINESS 
 
The Contractor shall maintain aircraft in a state of operational readiness to meet daily 
operational mission requirements.  It is imperative for meeting mission commitments that 
operational aircraft are available for flight.  If the daily operational mission requirements 
are not being completed due to a 10% or greater lack of mission capable aircraft, the 
Contractor shall submit a corrective action plan within 3 calendar days to the COR.  The 
Contractor shall comply with Commander Naval Air Pacific, Commander Naval Air 
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Atlantic, and local directives to ensure effective use of all aircraft throughout their 
predicted service life. 
 
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND SURGE CAPABILITY 
 
Aircraft assigned NSAWC missions consist of fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft.  The 
aircraft will be configured with Tactical Air Combat Training System (TACTS) pods, 
external Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) pods, Forward-Looking Infrared (FLIR), 
LDT, Air Intercept Missile (AIM-9) captive missiles, Air Launch Expendable (ALE-39) 
chaff, decoy flares and external fuel tanks.  Various air-to-ground weapons will be 
employed during advanced phases of Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor classes and during 
staff training outside of classes.  All configurations are dictated via the daily flight 
schedule. 
 
The F-14A is scheduled to fly 20 hours per aircraft per month.  Surge capability support 
can be increased to 30 hours per aircraft per month.  Quarterly flight hour totals will not 
normally exceed the projected 20 hours per aircraft per month rate (7 aircraft x 20 hours 
per aircraft X 3 months equals 420 hours quarterly subsequent to invoked base loading 
options). 
 
The F/A-18A/B is scheduled to fly an estimated 25 hours per aircraft per month.  Surge 
capability support can be increased to 35 hours per aircraft per month.  Quarterly flight 
hour totals will not normally exceed the projected 25 hours per aircraft per month.  (26 
aircraft x 25 hours per month X 3 months equals 1950 flight hours quarterly subsequent 
to base loading options). 
 
The SH-60/HH-60 is scheduled to fly an estimated 25 hours per aircraft per month.  
Surge capability support can be increased to 30 hours per aircraft per month.  Quarterly 
flight hour totals will not normally exceed the projected 25 hours per aircraft per month.  
(4 aircraft X 25 hours per month X 3 months equals 300 flight hours quarterly subsequent 
to invoked base loading options). 
 
3.3 REQUIRED AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY 
 
T/M/S       RRS  Minimum Daily  FMC  MAX NMCM  
          ACFT requirement   RATE 
 
F/A-18A   (22)   15     70%         10% 
F/A-18B       (4)     2     50%         10% 
 
Available aircraft will be computed by the following formula:  
 
RSS-NMCS-P&E/ISR-Navy Directed-NMCM=AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT 
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The sortie completion rate for all T/M/S aircraft is 95%.  A complete sortie is when 
an aircraft completes its mission per the flight schedule.  Sorties scheduled will be 
based upon an average of three sorties per available aircraft per day.  Deviations 
will be coordinated between the Site Manager and COR/MO. 
 
Should any sortie completion rate for any T/M/S fall below the required 95% for 
any given month, in the respective fiscal year, a reduction in payment will be made 
in accordance with special contract requirements entitled “Billing Commencement 
of Services”. 
 
 Sortie Completion rate of 95% is required: The sortie completion rate (SCR) is 
intended to identify the percent of total sorties scheduled (minus sorties canceled for 
weather or other non Contractor related clauses) that are successfully launched and 
completed.  In essence, it is a performance measure of meeting the daily flight schedules 
and accomplishing the intended missions.  The formula for SCR is: 
 
SCR%= (SCO+SCR+SCA)         x100% 
              ((SS+SR)- (SW+SO)) 
Where: 
SCO = Sorties completed IAW the original schedule 
SCR = Sorties completed that were rescheduled from the original schedule 
SCA = Sorties completed that were in addition to the original schedule 
SS   = Sorties on the original schedule 
SR   = Sorties on the original schedule, not completed for whatever reason) and  
 rescheduled for the same day 
SW  = Sorties canceled due to weather prior to launch 
SO  = Sorties canceled for operational reasons 
 
Additionally, ready for training aircraft and the material condition of the aircraft 
are indications of the Contractor’s ability to provide contract-required 
maintenance.  As indicated in Section H of the contract ready for training and 
material condition of the aircraft will be evaluated and reported.  Performance 
incentive fee will be apportioned accordingly. 
 
4.0 ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL MAINTENANCE 
 
The Contractor shall perform all organizational level (O-level) maintenance in 
accordance with this SOW to include those maintenance functions normally performed 
by an operating unit on a day-to-day basis in support of its mission and in accordance 
with OPNAVINST 4790.2 series.  
 
TRANSIENT SERVICES  
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The Contractor shall perform transient line functions to include directing, parking, 
securing, aircraft fire guard, and assistance to flight crew for transient Tactical Air 
Warfare Program aircraft.  
 
The Contractor shall provide transient maintenance services at Naval Air Station (NAS) 
Fallon and off-site detachments for an average of 3 transient aircraft per work day and up 
to 8 aircraft at any one time for any of the following T/M/S: F-14A; F/A-18A/B; E2C; 
SH-60/HH-60.  The Contractor shall provide flight line services including launch and 
recovery, chocking, tie-down, refueling, and daily/runaround inspections when required 
by the Naval Aircraft Maintenance Program (NAMP).  With the exception of other Navy 
Tactical Warfare NTAW aircraft maintained by the Contractor, transient aircraft 
maintenance is limited to normal flight line services.  These shall include line 
troubleshooting and repairs, replacement of tire and wheels, replacement of Weapons 
Replaceable Assembly’s (WRA) necessary for safe flight, component and assembly 
replacement and other maintenance not requiring a functional checkflight upon 
completion.  Transient NTAW aircraft maintained by the Contractor at other sites shall be 
considered as assigned aircraft for maintenance purposes. 
 
Contractor shall also provide the same transient services as listed in paragraph 4.1 above 
for F-14B/D and F/A-18C/D except as noted.  The Contractor will not provide line 
troubleshooting and repairs, replacement of WRA’s necessary for safe flight, and 
component and assembly replacement and any other maintenance requiring a functional 
check flight upon completion. 
 
4.2 CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE 
 
The Contractor shall perform corrective maintenance IAW applicable aircraft and 
component maintenance manuals.  Corrective maintenance procedures shall ensure 




NSAWC aircraft will routinely deploy to other USN/USAF/USMC bases for unit training 
missions.  Deployment bases/stations will provide the normal transient type servicing 
support (normally fuel and liquid oxygen).  The Contractor shall provide all aircraft 
maintenance services contained in this contract (less security access and roving patrols) 
when detached to these bases, while still supporting flight operations at NAS Fallon, NV.  
Bases that NSAWC will routinely deploy to include: 
 
LOCATION  #DETS/YEAR #DAYS #AIRCRAFT 
 
MCAS MIRAMAR, CA 1       14       10-14 
NAS LEMOORE, CA1        14       10-14 
NAS OCEANA, VA  1       14       10-14 
NAWC CHINA LAKE, CA 5         4       06-10 
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NAS KEY WEST, FL 1       14       10-14 
NELLIS AFB, NV  1       14          10-16 
 
Other bases that NSAWC will occasionally deploy to include: NAS JRB Fort Worth, TX; 
NAS NEW ORLEANS, LA; MCAS BEAUFORT, SC; MCAS CHERRY POINT, NC; 
and EILSON AFB, AK. 
 
The above lists are representative and do not preclude NSAWC from detaching to other 
sites should the need arise or preclude surging above indicated aircraft numbers. 
 
During certain periods NSAWC will detach to two or more sites simultaneously while 
continuing to operate at NAS Fallon, NV.  Detachment schedules will be provided to the 
Contractor in advance when available.  However, some detachments may be scheduled 
with short notice and require Contractor travel on weekends. 
 
4.3.1 Detachment Support 
 
The Contractor shall provide the support described in this contract for detachment 
support operations outside assigned station boundaries.  In the event assigned aircraft are 
not mission capable at a location other than assigned station, the Contractor shall provide 
the necessary maintenance support.  Travel/per diem shall be approved in advance by the 
COR.  
 
Detachments and services shall be required in support of a combination of aircraft of 
various type/model/series.  When Contractor personnel performing maintenance remain 
overnight at locations other than assigned station, per diem shall be paid at a rate not to 
exceed the rates specified in the Joint Travel Regulations (JTR). Personnel may utilize off 
base accommodations only when Government quarters are not available.  Authorization 
for use of other than Government quarters must be covered by a certification of non-
availability or justification by the COR.  Reimbursement will be based upon JTR.  Travel 
claims shall be completed and invoiced to the Government within 5 working days upon 
completion of travel. 
 
(NOTE:  The Contractor shall prepare and submit to the COR for approval “Invitational 
Orders” for all personnel authorized to perform off-site support.  All travel shall be in 
accordance with the Joint Travel Regulations, Vol. II and OPNAVINST 11103.1.) 
 
The following equivalency schedule shall apply to all personnel: 
 
  Site Manager - GS-13 
  Assistant site manager - GS-12 
  Leadmen/Senior Technicians - GS-9/GS-11 
  Mechanics - WG-8 
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When performing at a detached site, the Contractor shall replace at the detached site, at no 
cost to the Government, personnel who have voluntarily terminated, who have been 
terminated by the Contractor, or who have been removed from the detached site due to 
misconduct. 
 
Travel and per diem costs incurred in the replacement and/or relocation of personnel will 
not be reimbursed when such replacement and/or relocation is accomplished for the 
Contractor or employee’s convenience.  Paid, itemized receipts shall substantiate invoices.  
At the Government’s discretion, Government-furnished transportation may be provided in 
lieu of commercial transportation.  Anticipate delays in excess of 4 hours 10% of the time 
when Government transportation is provided. 
 
5.0 INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE 
 
The Contractor shall manage Production Control and Maintenance Control functions 
separately.  The Contractor shall perform nondestructive inspections: The Contractor 
shall provide Level II on site and have the ability to provide Level III on a temporary 
basis, for x-ray, eddy current, liquid penetrant, magnetic particle, and ultrasonic methods, 
as required, for assigned aircraft.  
 
6.0 LIMITED DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE 
 
The Contractor shall provide limited D level maintenance support for the Naval Tactical 
Air Warfare Program.  All limited D level maintenance shall be provided as an Over and 
Above action on a case by case basis.  Examples of limited D level maintenance actions 
include modification, component repair, aircraft paint ((other than corrosion control), 
painting indoors other than corrosion control shall be performed in Government approved 
facility.  This effort covered under optional CLIN), repair and/or replacement of airframe 
structural components/aircraft strain gauges, and integration/installation of various 
avionics modifications.  The Contractor will uncan engines, place the engines on rails, 
and equip them with Quick Engine Change Kits (QECK) for the TF-30 engine.  The 
Contractor may seek engineering support from non-Government sources with 
Government/TYCOM approval.  
 
9.0 GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, AND 
PROPERTY  
 
The Contractor shall manage Government Furnished Property in accordance with the 
Government Furnished Property Clauses contained in Section I of this contract, Federal 
Acquisition Regulations, Subpart 45, and other program requirements.  These shall 
include but are  not limited to, the IMRL Program, Tool Control Program, DEPOT Level 
Repairable Material Program, Plant and Minor Property requirements, and Navy Supply 
System regulations, instructions and directives.  
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The Contractor shall maintain site specific records of all Government Furnished Property 
per the requirements of FAR Subpart 45. The Contractor shall use and maintain an 
automated accounting system for accountability, tracking and inventory of all 
Government Furnished Property regardless of cost.  This system shall be used for all 
Government Property except IMRL, which shall be tracked and accounted for using the 
Government Furnished IMRL Program.  Contractor records are the official Government 
records in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulations, Subpart 45.  All Property 
CDRLs, including contract Phase out turn over records, shall be submitted in Stand 
Alone Material Management System (SAMMS). 
 
a.  The Contractor shall develop and submit, for Contracting Officer Approval, a 
Property Control Plan/System in accordance with FAR Subpart 45 and the property 
clauses identified in Section I of this contract.  This Property Control plan shall 
incorporate the provisions and requirements of identified property instructions and 
directives for the accountability, control, use, protection, preservation, inventory, 
movement, disposition, and maintenance of Government Furnished Property.  This 
Property Control Plan is required thirty days after contract award.  Proposed changes to 
the plan must be submitted to the PCO for approval prior to implementation. 
 
b.  The Contractor shall be liable for loss or damage to Government furnished 
property in accordance with the Government Property Clauses contained in Section I of 
this Contract.  In the case of loss or damage, the Contracting Officer shall determine the 
amount of the Contractor’s liability. The Contractor shall verbally notify the COR within 
24 hours of discovery of lost, damaged or destroyed Government Property and provide 
written notification within (5) workdays after verbal notification.  The written report shall 
be in accordance with FAR 45 requirements for Lost, Damage or Destroyed (LD&D) 
Government Property.  The Contractor shall also prepare and submit a Missing, Lost, 
Stolen and recovered (MLSR) Report per SECNAVINST 5500.4.  The official property 
records shall be adjusted with an approved DD Form 200, Survey document for all loss or 
destroyed Government Furnished Property.  
 
c.  The Contractor shall dispose of Government Property per direction of the CORs 
and the Property Administrator.  Government Property turned into Defense Reutilization 
and Marketing Office (DRMO) sha ll be documented and processed per DODINST 




The Contractor shall initiate and maintain a standard format of reports.  These reports 
shall be submitted to the Government, as stated in Exhibit A of the contract. 
 
e. Aircraft Status Report – The Contractor shall provide an Aircraft Status Report 
IAW CDRL, DD Form 1423, Item A005. 
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I. Daily Aircraft Readiness Status Report – The Contractor shall provide a Daily 





APPENDIX E.  3RD AND 4TH GENERATION AIRCRAFT 
CHARACTERISTICS 




$756,000  N/A 
Two General Electric J85s of 4,080 lbs. thrust each with 
afterburner 
One Tumansky R-11F-300 rated at 12,675 lb (w/ afterburner) 
    
47 feet, 2 inches  51 ft, 8.5 in (15.76 m) 
25 feet 3 inches  23 ft, 5.5 in (7.15 m) 
13 feet 2 inches  13 ft, 5.5 in (4.10 m) 
    
8,085 lb 12,882 lb (5843 kg) 
20,677 lb 21,605 lb (9800 kg) 
    
925 mph (Mach 1.4) at 36,000 feet Mach 2.05 (2175 km/h / 1,353 mph) 
50,500 feet 50,000 ft (15,250 m) 
with maximum fuel -- 1387 miles 600 nautical miles -- MiG-21bis 
Two 20-mm cannon in the fuselage nose; two AIM-9 Sidewinder 
at the wingtips; Five pylons carry up to 6200 pounds of 
ordinance or fuel tanks; loads can include four air-to-air missiles, 
Bullpup air-to-surface missiles, bombs, up to 20 unguided 
rockets, or external fuel tanks. 
One twin-barrel 23 mm GSh-23 cannon with two K-13A Atoll 
AAMs, two AA-2C Atoll or rocket packs. 500kg and 250kg 
bombs on ground attack missions. 
United States Norway  Russia Kazakhstan 
Bahrain Philippines Afghanistan Laos 
Brazil Saudi Arabia Albania (J-7) Libya 
Canada Singapore Algeria Madagascar 
Chile South Korea Angola Mali 
Ethiopia Spain Azerbaijan Mongolia 
Greece Sudan Bangladesh (J-7) Mozambique 
Honduras Switzerland Bulgaria Migeria 
Indonesia Taiwan Burma (J-7) North Korea 
Iran Thailand Cambodia North Yemen 
Jordan Tunisia China (J-7) Pakistan (F-7P, J-7) 
Kenya Turkey Congo Poland 
Libya Venezuela Croatia Romania 
Malaysia Vietnam Cuba Slovakia 
Mexico Yemen Czech Republic South Yemen 
Morocco   Egypt (F-7, J-7, MiG-21) Sri Lanka 
Netherlands   Ethiopia Sudan (J-7) 
    Finland Syria 
    Germany Tanzania (J-7) 
    Guinea Uganda 
    Hungary Vietnam 
    India Yugoslavia 
    Iran (J-7) Zambia 




Appendix E. (continued) 
Specifications F/A-18 Hornet  Su-27 Flanker SU-30 Flanker MiG-29 Fulcrum  
Primary Function: Multi-role attack and fighter 
aircraft 
Air superiority fighter Two-seat multirole fighter Multi-role fighter 
Contractor: McDonnell Douglas Sukhoi Sukhoi Mikoyan-Gurevich 
Crew: A: One; B:Two One 1 pilot, 1 weapons systems 
officer 
One 
Unit Cost: $29 million N/A $34 million N/A 
Powerplant Two F404-GE-402 enhanced 
performance turbofan engines 
(17,700 pounds (8,027 kg) static 
thrust each) 
Two NPO Saturn AL-31F 
turbofans each rated at 
17,857 lb (79.43 kN) dry 
thrust and 27,557 lb st 
(122.58 kN) with afterburner 
two Saturn/ Lyul'ka AL-31F 
afterburning turbofans, 
55,114 lb (245.16 kN)  
Two Klimov/Sarkisov RD-33 
turbofans at 18,298 
afterburning pounds of thrust 
each 
Dimensions         
Length: 56 feet (16.8 meters) 71 ft, 11.5 in (21.935 m) 71.92 ft (21.94 m)  56 feet and 10 inches  
Wingspan: 40 feet 5 inches (13.5 meters) 48 ft, 2.75 in (14.7 m) 48.17 ft (14.70 m)  37 feet and 3.25 inches  
Height: 15 feet 4 inches (4.6 meters) 19 ft, 5.5 in (5.932 m) 20.83 ft (6.36 m)  15 feet and 6.2 inches  
Weights          
Empty: 23,050 lb (10455 kg) -- F/A-18C 39,021 lb (17700 kg) 32,020 lb (17,700 kg)  24,030 pounds 
Maximum Takeoff: 51,900 pounds (23,537 kg) 66,138 lb (30000 kg) -- 
Flanker-B 
74,955 lb (34,000 kg)  40,785 lb (18500 kg) -- 
Fulcrum-A 
Performance          
Speed: Mach 1.7+ Mach 2.35 (1,553 mph; 
2500 km/h) 
1,320 mph at 32,780 ft, 
Mach 2.3 
Mach 2.3 (1,520 mph) 
Ceiling: 50,000+ feet 59,055ft (18,000m) 57,360 ft (17,500 m)  55,775 ft (17000 m) -- 
Fulcrum-A 
Range: Combat: 1.089 nautical miles 
(1252.4 miles/2003 km), clean 
plus two AIM-9s; Ferry: 1,546 
nautical miles (1,777.9 
miles/2844 km), two AIM-9s plus 
three 330 gallon tanks retained 
N/A typical: 1,620 nm, ferry: 
3,770 nm 
932 miles (810 nm / 1500 km) 
with internal fuel -- Fulcrum-A 
Armament One M61A1/A2 Vulcan 20mm 
cannon; AIM 9 Sidewinder, AIM 7 
Sparrow, AIM-120 AMRAAM, 
Harpoon, Harm, SLAM, SLAM-
ER, Maverick missiles; Joint 
Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW); Joint 
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM); 
various general purpose bombs, 
mines and rockets. 
One 30 mm GSh-
301cannon, up to 6,000 kg 
payload of missiles and 
bombs including AA-10 
(Alamo) air-to-air missiles, 
AA-11 (Archer) air-to-air 
missiles, FAB-100 
8,000 of weaponsone 30-
mm GSh-301 cannon (149 
rds) R-33/AA-9 Amos, R-
27/AA-10 Alamo, R-73/AA-
11 Archer, R-77/AA-12 Kh-
29/AS-14 Kedge, Kh-
31/AS-17 Krypton, Kh-59 
free-fall, cluster bombs 
rocket pods, ECM pods 
One 30mm GSh-301 cannon 
with 150 rounds, Six AAMs 
including a mix of SARH and 
AA-8 Aphid (R60), AA-10 
Alamo (R27T), AA-11 Archer, 
(R73), FAB 500-M62, FAB-
1000, TN-100, ECM Pods, S-
24, AS-12, AS-14 
KNOWN 
OPERATORS:  
United States  Russia Russia Russia        Malaysia 
  Australia Belarus  China  Algeria        Moldova 
  Canada China  India  Angola        North Korea 
  Finland Ukraine    Belarus       Peru 
  Kuwait     Bulgaria       Poland 
  Malaysia     Croatia        Romania 
  NASA     Cuba           Slovakia 
  Spain     Czech Republic          Syria 
  Switzerland     Germany    Turkmenistan 
        Hungary      Ukraine 
        India           Uzbekistan 
        Iran             Yemen 
        Iraq              Yugoslavia 
        Kazahkstan  
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APPENDIX F.  LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AVDLR   Aviation Depot Level Repairable     
CNO   Chief of Naval Operations     
DOD   Department of Defense      
FY   Fiscal Year       
I-Level   Intermediate Level       
MCAS   Marine Corps Air Station     
NAS   Naval Air Station      
NAVAIR   Naval Air Systems Command     
NAVICP   Naval Inventory Control Point     
NAVSUP   Naval Supply Systems Command     
O-Level   Organizational Level       
T/M/S   Type/Model/Series        
USMC   United States Marine Corps     
USN   United States Navy      
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APPENDIX G.  GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
APPROPRIATION. An authorization established by an Act of the Congress of the 
United States to spend funds of the US Treasury, or incur indebtedness, for specified 
purposes.  Appropriations fund, among other things, the operation and maintenance 
requirements of the operating forces. The appropriation is only available for citation on 
requisitions for the fiscal year established and for the recording of related expenditures 
for the following 2 years hereafter.  
 
AVIATION DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABLE (AVDLR). These are the repairable 
spare parts that support naval aviation. Prior to April 1985 new repairable spares were 
purchased from the appropriation procurement account, repairable items were reworked 
by the depot maintenance activities and financed by an O&M, N account, and not 
charged against the FHP. These spares were issued at no cost to the operating commands. 
Under the current system, aviation commands purchase AVDLR replacement parts from 
the stock fund using funds budgeted for in the Operating Target Functional Category 
(OFC)-50 budget. 
 
AVIATION DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABLE (AVDLR) COST: Identifies the sum of 
the reported Aviation Depot Level Repairable (AVDLR) cost for the reported WUC. 
AVDLR costs pertain to repairable items that are removed at the intermediate level of 
maintenance and sent as a BCM to the depot for repair. The AVDLR Cost for a particular 
NIIN is the Net Price, or the price that the fleet is charged after turning in a carcass. The 
Net Price is comprised of two components: the Item Repair Cost, which is the price that 
NAVICP pays the Organic Depot, Interservice Depot, or Commercial Source to repair an 
item; and the Cost Recovery Rate, which is the cost of supply system operations. 
 
COMMANDER NAVAL AIR FORCE RESERVE. The Naval Air Force Reserve is 
VFC-13’s TYCOM and is commanded by a Rear Admiral and is headquartered in New 
Orleans, La.  Today's Naval Air Force Reserve had its genesis in 1946 with the 
establishment of the Naval Air Reserve Training Command, headquartered at Naval Air 
Station Glenview, Ill.  In 1973, the air and surface training commands were combined in 
New Orleans, La., under the Chief of Naval Reserve who reports directly to the Chief of 
Naval Operations.  In 1983, the Naval Air Force Reserve was established as a separate 
command within the Naval Reserve Force structure and was directed from New Orleans 
by a Rear Admiral.  In 2002, Commander, Naval Air Reserve was disestablished and the 
Naval Air Force Reserve was formed. 
 
CONSUMABLE COST: The cost of replacement for an item that is not intended to be 
repaired, i.e. a disposable item. The cost of consumables is obtained by using the standard 
price for that item from the Consumable Price File. The Standard Price is comprised of 
two components: the Replacement Price, which is the Price that NAVICP or DLA pays 
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the contractor for a new part; and the Cost Recovery Rate, which is the cost of supply 
system operations. 
 
CREW. As utilized for OP-20 and FHP purposes, a crew is the number of pilots required 
to fly an aircraft. For a single-piloted aircraft such as the AV-8B or the F-4, a crew is one 
pilot. For a dual-piloted aircraft such as the CH-46 or KC-130, a crew is two pilots. (The 
crew of an A-6 is 1 pilot.)   
 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD): The department of the US government 
responsible for the management and funding of the armed forces in the defense of a threat 
of war against the United States, and any other tasks as designated by the President and 
Congress. 
 
FISCAL YEAR (FY): The Fiscal Year corresponds to the annual budget and 
appropriations schedule, and reflects the period defined by the calendar dates 1 October 
of the previous year through the following 30 September. 
 
FIVE-YEAR DEFENSE PROGRAM (FYDP). The major financial performance plan 
of the Department of Defense for accomplishment within a 5-year period. The FYDP 
structure provides a method of aggregating forces, money, and manpower within one of 
10 major categories or building blocks classified as major programs. The 10 major 
programs which aggregate the entire defense posture into broad functional classifications 
of similar military missions are as follows: 
 
Program I - Strategic Forces 
Program II - General Purpose Forces (majority of Navy 
operating force units are assigned to this 
program) 
Program III - Intelligence and Communications 
Program IV - Airlift and Sealift 
Program V - Guard and Reserve Forces 
Program VI - Research and Development 
Program VII - Central Supply and Maintenance 
Program VIII - Training, Medical, and Other General 
Personnel Activities 
Program IX - Administration and Associated Activities 
Program X - Support of Other Nations 
 
I-LEVEL MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY: Intermediate maintenance (I-Level) is 
performed by designated maintenance activities that have responsibility for direct support 
of using organizations. Its phases normally consist of calibration, repair or replacement or 
damaged or unserviceable parts, components, or non-available parts: and provisions of 
technical assistance to using organizations. 
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MAJOR CLAIMANT. Bureau, office, or command (e.g., CINCLANTFLT and 
CINCPACFLT) designated as an administering office under the operation and 
maintenance appropriation which receive operating budgets directly from the CNO. 
 
NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND (NAVAIR): One of five Navy systems 
commands.  NAVAIR is responsible for the acquisition of aircraft and other aviation-
related weapons systems, as well as managing the associated logistical support 
infrastructure.  
 
NAVAL CENTER FOR COST ANALYSIS (NCCA): A Navy activity responsible for 
guiding cost ana lyses within the Department of the Navy. Serves as an advisor to the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller 
(ASN(FMC)), and manages the Navy VAMOSC program. 
 
NAVAL INVENTORY CONTROL POINT (NAVICP): Two field activities within 
the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), one located in Mechanicsburg, PA, the 
other in Philadelphia, PA. They maintain Navy-wide control systems, and also perform 
the functions of a stock control activity. The NAVICP in Philadelphia has primary 
responsibility for the inventory management of aviation-related items. 
 
O-LEVEL MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY: Organizational maintenance (O-level) is the 
lowest level of maintenance performed on aircraft. It is squadron- level activity, and 
includes inspecting, servicing, lubricating, and replacing WRAs. 
 
OFC. A system whereby the various categories of O&M,N budgeting and funding are 
assigned a numerical designator.  Each OFC supports a particular function/purpose. 
 
OP-20. A Department of the Navy (DON) planning document published by the Special 
Assistant for the FHP several times per year to establish the annual flying hours by TMS, 
which is used for FHP funding and fleet planning. Requirements are computed by using 
historical data and revised with FMF inputs.  The OP-20 shows: required hours computed 
from factors of Primary Mission Readiness (PMR) requirements, crew seat ratios, force 
structure, and staff hours; budgeted hours computed as a percentage of PMR; cost per 
hour by TMS; total costs by budget line item; and total TMS costs. Also see enclosure (3) 
for detailed methodology. 
 
OFC-50 AVIATION FLEET MAINTENANCE (AFM). Funding for AFM of aircraft.  
Includes the cost of material used in support of the aircraft such as consumable repair 
parts and paints, petroleum, oil, lubricants (POL) used in intermediate and organic 
maintenance of aircraft, AVDLR and non-AVDLR material used in direct organic 
maintenance of aircraft. AFM is one of three components of OP-20 Cost Per Hour (CPH). 
See NAVSO P-3013-2 for detailed listing. 
 
TYCOM. An intermediate level of command which is directly subordinate to the Fleet 
CINC. Financial authority is issued by major claimants (Fleet CINC) to TYCOM’s in the 
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form of  expense limitations. Amounts therein are available for issuance of operating 
budgets, and from operating budgets, issuance of OPTAR’s. 
 
TMS. The specific designation of aircraft used by the military and used by the DON FHP 
for planning and funding. Type refers to the mission of the aircraft, such as attack (A), 
fighter (F), etc. Model refers to the particular airframe in that mission category, such as 
an A-4 or F-4. The series is a particular configuration within the model, such as an A-4E 
or A-4M, or an F-4N or F-4S. The series indicates equipment that is installed on board 
that gives it individual mission or performance capabilities. In most cases, the higher the 
letter designator - the newer the series. This is not always true such as in the case of the 
CH-46E which followed the CH-46F series. 
 
VISIBILITY AND MANAGEMENT OF OPERATING AND SUPPORT COST 
(VAMOSC): A Naval program which presents the direct costs for ships, aircraft, and 
weapons systems. VAMOSC is capable of providing cost data across the gamut of Naval 
activity, from high- level aggregate reports to detailed reports on individual systems 
during specific time periods. 
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